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PRICE DISCRIMINATION, COMPETITION, AND CONFUSION:
ANOTHER LOOK AT ROBINSON-PATMAN
FREDERICK M. ROWEt
"Sometimes I doubt whether we ever needed the Robinson-Patman
law, with all its elusive uncertainty. I have thought that the Sherman
Act, properly interpreted and administered, would have remedied all
the ills meant to be cured."
-Lindley, J., in U.S. v.
N.Y. Great A & P Tea
Co., 67. F. Supp. 626, 676
(E.D. Ill. 1946).
WHEN Robinson-Patman became law in 1936,1 chain stores were the legis-
lative target. Consistent ability to undersell independent retailers rapidly
expanded mass distribution systems in the twenties. 2 Subsequent depression
years supplied cost-cutting incentive, sharpened consumer price-consciousness,
and accelerated the shift to streamlined, cheaper forms of distribution.3 A
seemingly uncheckable trend threatened to eliminate independent wholesalers
and retailers.4 The FTC Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, filed
in 1934,5 concluded that discriminatory price concessions to chain buyers were
tjMember of the Class of 1952, Yale Law School.
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
2. Chains between 1920 and 1930 more than tripled their outlets. At the same time
the number of chains diminished. Concentration of control accompanied rapid expansion
of area. By 1930, 7,000 chains operated 160,000 outlets. In the retail food trade, chains
accounted for 13% of outlets, but handled 29% of the total amount of business. Cheaper
selling techniques, economies of large scale operation, and purchasing concessions con-
sistently enabled mass distributors to undersell independents. ZORN & FELDMAN, Busi-
Nss UNDER THE NEW PRIcE LAws, 7-8, 20 (1937) (hereinafter cited as ZORN &
FELDMAN).
3. See, e.g., ZORN & FELDMAN at 26-27, 277.
4. Id. at 19-23, and see note 6 infra.
5. In 1928, the Senate directed an investigation by the FTC to determine "how far
the rapid increase in the chain-store system of distribution is based upon actual savings
in costs of management and operation and how far upon quantity prices available only
to chain-store distributors." Sen. Res. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CONG. REc. 7857
(1928). The investigation culminated in a final report in 1934. See note 6 infra.
The FTC REPORT concluded that "[t]o the extent that chain stores consistently under-
sell independents we may expect a steady trend toward final chain-store supremacy and
dominance in distribution which is apparently uncheckable." FTC, FINAL REPORT ON
THE CHAIN STORE INvEsTIGATION 86-87 (1934). e-
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a prime source of their competitive advantage.6 Since existing law could not
curb such discrimination 7 Congressional action was recommended." The
Robinson-Patman Act followed.
Despite the limited objectives of its framers, the statute is drawn in uni-
versals. Discriminatory practices in any market context fall under the ban
of the Robinson-Patman Act. Apparently Congressional doubts of the con-
6. FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATIO N, 57-58, 85 (1934). The
various types of discriminatory concessions secured by chains were summarized id. at
59-63. For criticism of the REP RVT'S conclusions, see McNair, Marketing Functions and
Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 334 (1937). He contends
that integrated functions rather than buying power is the principal source of chain-store
economies. Id. at 343. See similarly, Cassady, The Integrated Marketing Institution and
Public Welfare, 6 J. MARI.ETING 252, 255-59 (1942).
7. Section 2 of the old Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), prohibited price discrimina-
tion whose effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce." The Act was directed at predatory price cutting that eliminated
competition among sellers. See, e.g., Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 447 n.1 (1937) ; legislative
history quoted in Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied,
262 U.S. 759 (1923). Accordingly, courts at first refused to interfere with price dis-
crimination that harmed competition among buyers. See Mennen Co. v. FTC, supra;
National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613
(1924). But in George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929),
the Supreme Court brushed aside legislative history and read "clear" statutory language
to forbid lessening of competition among buyers as well. However, a statutory proviso
exempting discriminations made "on account. of differences ... in quantity in the com-
modity sold" rendered Van Camp impotent. A quantity sale permitted unlimited price
discrimination. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939),
ccrt. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939). The FTC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 90-91, was aware
of the loophole. It pointed out that "prior to the Van Camp decision, during a period
when chain stores were enjoying an extensive growth based largely upon special price
concessions from manufacturers, the Commission was prevented by court decisions from
applying section 2 of the Clayton Act to ameliorate the resultant competitive situation
between the chains, the cooperatives, and the independents. Id. at 90.
For general discussion of Clayton Act aims and administration, consult MiL.a, UNFAIR
COMPETITION 130-41 (1941) (hereinafter cited as MILE).
8. The FTC recommended amending the Clayton Act io read "It shall be unlawful...
to discriminate unfairly or unjustly between different purchasers. . . 2' FTC REPORT,
supra note 6, at 96-97. But to chain-store opponents this appeared too mild. Extensive
Congressional hearings followed and led to the final formulation of the Robinson-Patman
Act. For the checkered congressional history of the Act, see ZORN & FELDMAN at 51-56;
Rose, The Right of a Businessman to Lower the Price of His Goods, 4 VAND. L. REv.
221, 236-37 (1951). The U.S. Wholesale Grocers' Association became a prime mover
behind the legislation. In fact, counsel for the Association is said to have drafted the
Patman bill. ZORN & FELDMAN at 51 n.4; Rose, supra, at 237 n.70.
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stitutionality of special legislation9 turned the anti-chain store bill into a legal
umpire over all interstate business pricing.10
A GLOSSARY FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATION"
The American business structure facilitates discriminatory pricing. Under
conditions of perfect competition, competitors bound by a "going" market price
obviously cannot discriminate.12 But where sellers are few or in concert, where
9. Cf. the following colloquy between Sen. Vandenberg and Sen. Logan, in charge of
the bill in the Senate:
Mr. Vandenberg: Is it not a fact that this provision was written entirely with the field
of retail merchandising in mind, and that it never was contemplated that it was intended
to reach into industrial production?
Mr. Logan: Really that was my idea about it. However, it had to be general. We
could not pick out one particular business.
Mr. Logan: But I had no idea . . . that it had anything to do with the automobile
industry.
Mr. Logan: But I apprehend that if we attempt to make exemptions of particular
classes of business we may run into difficulties with the Supreme Court. . . . If we
exempt one group, and make the law apply to another, I am afraid we may have some
serious constitutional difficulty. 80 CoNG. REc. 6429 (1936).
10. The Robinson-Patman Act early was recognized as an anti-chain store measure
and severely criticized on that premise. McNair, supra note 6; McAllister, Price Control
by Law in the United States, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 273, 289 (1937) ; Burns, The Anti-
trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, id. at 301; McLaughlin, The Courts
and the Robinson-Patman Act, id. at 410; Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law:
Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARv. Bus. REv. 137 (1937); Comment, 46
YALE L.J. 447, 479 (1937). And see Rep. Patman's statement, "Chain stores are out.
There is no place for chain stores in the American economic picture." Quoted in McNair,
supra note 6, at 334 n.l. But ef. Hamilton & Loevinger, The Second Attack on Price
Discrimination, 22 WAsir. U.L.Q. 153 (1937).
11. In economic terms, discrimination implies that a seller charges different prices for
identical products sold at the same time under identical conditions. Conditions include
quantities sold, credit and delivery terms, and the seller's marginal costs. If all except one
variable are identical, there is discrimination. Obviously there may be discrimination
even when prices are uniform. And to complicate analysis, in most sales transactions two
or more of the variables differ. M11,zR at 122-23, 145 n.7; EDWARDS, MAINTAININC
CompETION 164 n.9 (1949). The complexity of the problem has caused difficulty in
defining price discrimination. Economists' definitions call for economic analysis. See, e.g.,
"exercising a different degree of monopoly power ... between two sales." MIUa at
123. Selling a "homogeneous commodity at the same time to different purchasers at
different prices." BuRNs, DECLINE OF ComP orrrloN 273 (1936).
The Robinson-Patman Act, however, has polevaulted analytic barriers. Under it
price differences, regardless of other variables, may be illegal discriminations; and uni-
form-price policies, although often systematic economic discriminations, are sanctioned by
law. In order to accommodate the following discussion to legal concepts, legal nomencla-
ture has been adopted.
12. Perfect competition presupposes (1) perfect knowledge by buyers and sellers of
products, prices, and terms of sale; (2) uniformity of products so that buyers can shift
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products are differentiated in fact or fancy, and where powerful buyers range
the market, some buyers pay less than others for similar goods. In short, any
market imperfection permits a degree of price discrimination 13 through which
sellers adapt their prices to different demand elasticities of buyers. The follow-
ing are typical forms that price discrimination takes.
Trade or functional discount. The seller's schedule fixes discounts from
quoted price to buyers classified according to rank on the distribution ladder.
Typical systems allow reductions to wholesalers, jobbers, and retailers in
decreasing amounts, regardless of size of individual transactions or aggregate
sales volume. A wholesaler may buy ten units during one year. But a retailer
who buys 100 units each month must pay the higher price.
Quantity discount. The size of an individual sale within a quantity bracket
determines specified price reductions. Any buyer regardless of trade function
is eligible for the discount, and aggregate sale volumes are immaterial. Buyers
taking smaller quantities may pool purchases to qualify for discount brackets.
A typical discount schedule allows reductions for carload quantity sales.
Volume discount. The discount schedule allows progressively larger price
concessions based on sales aggregates over a period of time. Size of individual
sales and the buyer's trade function are disregarded. Frequently purchases
ranging over a seller's entire product line, and sometimes even similar pur-
chases from his competitors, are aggregated to qualify for greater discounts.
A chain store typically gets lower prices on a hundred small orders of products
quickly among sellers to seek the best possible deal; (3) a large number of small buyers
and sellers individually unable to affect overall price; (4) active competition unrestrained
by private agreement or public control. Prices would be forced to the minimum level of
costs and profits and automatically adjust output capacity to demand. A seller pricing
above this level would lose all sales to competitors. And no seller reduces his price
because he sells all he can produce at the going market price. See, e.g., EDWARDS,
MAINTAINING COMPETITION 6-8 (1949); WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
AERICAN INDUSTRY 2-3 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940) (hereinafter cited as WILCOX) ;
BAIN, PRICING, DISTRBUTON AND EMPLOYMENT 47-50 (1948) (hereinafter cited as
BAIN).
13. Perfect competition is an economic fiction not duplicated by business realities.
WILCOX at 3-5. Businessmen set prices within an area of discretion. Complexities of
modern manufacturing processes, increasing differentiation of manufactured goods ac-
centuated by brand names and advertising, and sellers' concentration and concerted action
are powerful factors expanding the area of price discretion. See, e.g., NELSON & KEim,
PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS POLICY 4-10 (TNEC Monograph 1, 1940) (hereinafter
cited as NELSON & KEIm). For some prerequisites of price discrimination in imperfect
markets, see Cassady, Some Economic Aspects of Price Discrimination under Non-Perfect
Market Conditions, 11 J. MARKETING 7 (1946). Price discrimination does not presuppose
monopoly control. Sellers' knowledge and buyers' ignorance of market conditions permits
discriminatory prices. A fault line in the market that prevents those on one side of the
line from taking advantage of a price established on the other keeps discrimination going.
Id. at 15, 18-20. And see Edwards, Types of Differential Pricing, 6 J. MARKETING Supp.
156, 163 (1942).
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A, B, and C placed by its individual sales outlets than another buyer who
makes one large purchase of A.
Discrimination between segregated markets. Buyers not fully competing
with each other pay different prices for substantially identical goods. A car
manufacturer, for example, pays a lower price for accessories used for installa-
tion than does an accessories distributor making replacement sales.
Selective discrimination. Selected buyers get unsystematic price concessions
which are not openly quoted. The seller selects these low-price customers to
accomplish any of a number of purposes.
SOME PURPOSES AND MARKET EFFECTS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Market strategy shapes a firm's pricing policy and patterns of price dis-
crimination.14 Discriminatory practices vary among industries, and among
firms within one industry. Even a single firm may use a combination of dis-
criminatory pricing methods.' 5 Only a broad aim to maximize profits is
common to all forms of price discrimination. Nor does any specific practice
entail inevitable economic consequences-market structures shape market
effects.' 6 But some more obvious purposes match particular discriminatory
techniques with generally predictable market results.
Determining channels of distribution. Functional or trade discounts seg-
mentize the distribution process.Y7 When a producer finds direct selling to
small retail outlets inconvenient, dealing through middlemen shifts his burden
of warehousing, delivery, and the credit risks of scattered small accounts.' 8
14. Edwards, supra note 13, at 157-58. Because today's emphasis on imperfect markets
and overhead costs has cut adrift the classical economic analysis of price discrimination,
Dr. Edwards argues that new efforts to classify and appraise the phenomena of price
difference are overdue. Id. at 156. Much of this article rests on Dr. Edwards' valuable
outline and suggestions. For an analysis of price discrimination in terms of modern
economic theory, see also Cassady: Some Economic Aspects of Price Discrimination
under Non-Perfect Market Conditons, 11 J. MARKETING 7 (1946); Techniques and Pur-
poses of Price Discrimination, id. at 135; Legal Aspects of Price Discrimination, id. at
258, 377 (1947).
15. See id. at 144-45; Edwards, The Struggle for Control of Distribution, 1 J. MAR-
KETING 212 (1937) passim.
16. For general analysis of price discrimination's economic effects, consult MILLER at
122-30, 161-93; RoBINSON, EcoNoMIcs OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION, cc. 15, 16 (1933).
17. See Edwards, supra note 15; Edwards, Types of Differential Pricing, 6 J. MARKET-
ING Supp. 156, 163-64 (1942).
18. See, e.g., ZORN & FELDMAN at 3-6, 167 for description of typical middleman
functions.
19511
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A trade discount system accordingly attempts to compensate for these shifted
distributive functions with scaled price concessions. 19
Well-ordered middleman systems kept alive by functional discounts tend to
resale price fixing programs.20  Producers may dislike competition among
distributors that spreads upward to force cuts in their own profit margins.
21
Resale price control by a producer's forward integration into retailing is costly,
and is not feasible if his product alone cannot support separate sales outlets.
Effective resale price maintenance, however, confers the benefits of integration
without its burdens. 22 And when the producer alone cannot supervise scattered
retailers, a co-operating middlemn system can police deviations from the man-
ufacturer's "suggested" price.
23
But modern marketing methods have shattered the symmetry of old-line dis-
tribution. Whereas distributor classifications once matched their functions,
24
new processes cut across old labels. 235 On the one hand, middlemen perform
less than their traditional full functions-a desk jobber may never see the
goods. On the other, chain stores and mail-order houses integrate wholesale
and retail functions to cut costs and prices.26 Moreover, for many sellers,
dealing through only one distributive channel is inadequate. Lack of alternative
channels is risky and may leave a part of the market untapped. Sellers, there-
fore, "straddle the market" and move goods at the same time through middle-
19. See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REv. 27, 38 (1949);
McNair, supra note 6, at 340, 345.
20. For critical analysis of resale price maintenance, consult Mn=.a at 230-66;
EDV ADS, MLANTAINING COmPETITION 66-73 (1949); FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRIcE
MAUNTENANCE (1945) passn.
21. See Adelman, supra note 19, at 46; Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1122 (1949).
22. Ibid.; Bums, in The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust Laws: A Symposium,
39 Ari. Ecox. RFv. 689, 691-92 (1949). Burns defines resale price maintenance as
"indirect integration." Id. at 692.
23. Comment, 58 YAiE L.J. 1121, 1126-29 (1949); Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300 (1919). And see notes 96 and 97 infra.
24. For a brief outline of the traditional manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer distribution
chann.', see ZORN & FELDmAN at 3-6.
25. McNair, mupra note 6, at 339, 341, 345, 348. And see Shniderman, "The Tyranny
of Labels" 60 HARv. L. REv. 571, 574-75 (1947).
26. ZORN & FELDAIAN at 167-68; Edwards, The Struggle for the Control of Distribu-
tion, 1 J. MAR=ETING 212 (1937). "In the field of wholesaling alone are full line and
short line wholesalers, service wholesalers, cash and carry distributors, drop shippers,
. . . desk jobbers, and many others." George, Business and the Robinson-Patinan Act,
4 LAw & CoNTEmT. PROB. 392, 395 (1937). Integration of manifold middleman func-
tions results in superior operating efficiency and permits lower retail prices. See, e.g.,
Cassady, The Integrated Marketing Institution and Public Welfare, 6 J. MARITING
252, 253, 257-59 (1942); McNair, supra note 6, at 341.
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man systems and directly to large retail outlets.27 Aggressive distributors and
a disorganized market structure thwart sellers' attempts to stabilize price 23
Quantity discounts, on the other hand, may reflect distribution economies
rather than shifted functions 29 and slice through the maze of functional labels.
Carload shipments are obviously cheaper than small-lot distribution. Econom-
ical quantities shrink handling and service costs. 3 0 In addition, a quantity
discount schedule that permits pooling of small buyers' orders invites direct
producer-market outlet dealing.31 Splitting traditional middleman functions 
3 2
between buyer and seller short-circuits a middleman profit. The result is
streamlined and lower-cost 33 distribution.
Accommodating market pressures. Volume discounts are systematic con-
cessions to powerful buyers;34 the size of the discount registers degrees of
27. "A manufacturer, as a practical matter, frequently is forced to straddle. Perhaps
most of his merchandise still goes through wholesalers and small independent retailers,
but in view of the increasing importance of chains he will cut himself off from too large
a part of his consumer market if he does not sell some of his goods through them;
and, looking to the future, he does not dare place sole reliance on a single channel of
distribution which may conceivably dwindle and dry up." McNair, supra note 6, at
345-46 (1937). "The strongest practical justification for the wholesaler's discount, as
a matter of policy, is the manufacturer's interest in keeping the independent wholesaler
in business, partly because of the wholesaler's ability to distribute to independent
retailers in rural areas . . . and partly to prevent the chain-store purchasers from
dominating distribution completely." Comment, 46 Y.L L.J. 447, 455 (1937).
28. Adelman, supra note 19, at 62-63; Bums, supra note 10, at 318. An aggressively
competing retailer has succeeded in practically tumbling the resale price maintenance
structure built up under Miller-Tydings Act sanction. Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). See note 96 infra.
29. Adelman, supra note 19, at 39.
30. Ibid.
31. Cf. Edwards, Types of Differential Pricing, 6 J. AnkREIG Supp. 156, 163-64
(1942).
32. See notes 24 and 26 supra.
33. "When integration pays, the saving is essentially in the cost of transfer.'?
Adelman, supra note 19, at 29.
34. Edwards, supra note 31, at 161. This is most readily apparent when buyers
are permitted to aggregate purchases not only from the seller granting the discount,
but his competitors as well. Because volume discounts induce a large buyer to con-
centrate his later purchases with his earlier supplier, other sellers must offer equivalent
concessions to lure him away. Ibid. For an example, cf. Brief of Counsel Supporting
the Complaint, p. 5, General Motors Corp. and AC Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 5620
(pending).
Volume discounts, besides clearly favoring chain stores, act "in part as an exclusive
dealing arrangement" because they tend to concentrate the purchases of any one buyer
upon one seller. Moreover, in industries where limited-line and full-line manufacturers
compete, volume discounts based on full-line purchase aggregates clearly foreclose
limited-line producers from sales. Miu3za at 150.
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market pressure. Sellers do not "favor" 35 market giants who beat down prices,
but placate coercion with concessions. When unused operating capacity eats
into sellers' profits, price concessions come easier. Sales at any price above
out-of-pocket costs spread overhead and earn profits or cut losses.3 6 That is
why they are made. But a uniform price at this level would bankrupt the firm
because its fixed costs would not be fully covered.
3 7
Systematic discrimination contains its own limitations. When both low and
high-price buyers market an identical sellers' product down the line, the product
competes with itself at every step in distribution and in the final sale.38 Dis-
crimination great enough to permit low-price buyers an arbitrage profit by
selling to high-price buyers cannot last.3 9 Concessions to some tend to spread
to all. Buyer-coerced discrimination in the end can force all the seller's prices
down.40
Discriminating between segregated markets, on the other hand, guarantees
sellers more permanent success. When market splitting prevents buyers from
reselling to each other and high-price buyers from shifting into the low-price
field, a seller can tailor price to differing market pressures.41  Since there is
no leakage of price benefits, the high pressure of some buyers does not benefit
all others. 42 Car manufacturers who depress price for original installation
35. In less sophisticated Robinson-Patman Act discussions, "favored buyer" is a
convenient descriptive device. Sinister connotations of the phrase spread a haze of
unlawfulness that obscures the need for economic analysis of price discrimination.
36. "Out-of-pocket" or "marginal" cost is the added cost needed to produce a small
additional amount of output. See, e.g., CLARK, ALTERNATIVE TO SERFPom 64 (1948).
Because demand fluctuates, plants are built to take care of demand increases. Under
average business conditions, therefore, plants may operate short of capacity. Id. at 80;
Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1289, 1346-47
(1948). For an excellent discussion of the interrelationship between unused capacity
and price discrimination, see id. at 1328-30; cf. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 63 HARv. L. RLv. 27, 39-40 (1949).
37. Cf. id. at 40.
38. Cf. ML.LR at 233.
39. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 H~Av. L. Rv. 27, 38-39 (1949).
40. "A strong, alert buyer, large enough so that the loss of his patronage is not a
matter of indifference, constantly on the watch for a break which he can exploit by
rolling up the whole price front, able to force concessions first from one and then from
all, and followed by other buyers, can collapse a structure of control or keep it from ever
coming into existence." Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61
HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1300 (1948). And cf. Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 975 (1949).
41. Le., differing elasticities of demand. See M.a.I at 126-30. For classification and
discussion of market splitting techniques, see Cassady, supra note 14, at 135-44; Edwards,
Types of Differential Pricing, 6 J. MARKETING Supp. 156 (1942). And see Maroni,
Discrinmiation under Market Interdependence, 62 Q. J. EcoN. 95 (1947) for the economic
limitations on a firm's tailored price spreads.
42. Edwards, supra note 41, at 157.
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accessories, for example, do not influence high prices to replacement dealers.43
Or when a mail-order house coerces a low price for rubber tires to be sold
under its own brand label, it may interfere little with higher-price sales under
another label.44 Such a seller-buyer relationship can make for a long-lasting
and mutually profitable co-existence. The seller has an assured market and
with small risk can earn large profits ;45 the buyer has bought favorably and
profits in his later operations.
In non-competitive sectors of the economy, price discrimination among segre-
gated markets may be preferable to price uniformity. The discriminatory low
price may tap new demand areas that otherwise would not buy at all. And even
high-price buyers may benefit relatively. A seller's stepped-up output and
fuller plant utilization cuts unit costs and may reduce all prices to a point
below a non-discriminatory one-price level.
4C
Stifling, meeting, or creating competition. Selective price cuts can eliminate
the competition of smaller rivals and entrench monopoly control. Sellers who
operate in wider markets may drastically cut prices in smaller rivals' territory
to enforce price leadership or to drive out competitors altogether. 47 In either
case, competition is dead. A price raider, however, does not "recoup" local
losses by raising his prices elsewhere; he already should be charging all the
market can bear.48 Future monopoly profits make up the present loss.
But selective price concessions may merely maintain competition. Sellers
shade established rivals' prices to gain footholds in new markets or to attract
43. Cf. the Champion, case, discussed at pp. 951-55 infra.
44. Cf. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939). Goodyear sold tires to Sears, Roebuck at substantially
cheaper prices than to independent dealers. The tires were identical except for trademark
and thread pattern. These superficial differentiations, and the secrecy of the arrangement,
blocked buyer shifts from high to low-price identical product. See MILLEiR at 128-29,
136-39 for a discussion of the case.
45. Sears purchased under a ten-year requirements contract. Goodyear made a net
profit of $7.7 million on sales of $116 million worth of tires to Sears during the years
1926-33. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620, 622 (6th Cir. 1939).
46. See MILLER at 164-65, citing RoBINsoN, EcoNomics OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
201-5 (1933); BuRNs, DECLINE OF COMPETITION 277 (1937); CLARK, SocIA. CONTROL OF
Busixzss 356-57 (2d ed. 1939) ; Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws,
61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1330-1 (1948); Fly, Observations on the Antitrust Laws,
Economic Theory, and the Sugar Institute Decisions, 45 YALE L.J. 1339, 1347, 1367 (1936).
47. Cf. Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929); E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511
(6th Cir. 1944). For discussion, see EDwARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 159 (1949).
48. The economic fallacy of "recoupment" has been demolished by able writers. "It
would be a strange businessman who was able to raise prices to buyer X, but waited
until he lowered them to Y." Adelman, supra note 46, at 1331; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969,
974 (1949). Yet the "illiterate notion that lower prices to some buyers must neces-
sarily imply higher prices to others" does not die. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 8, at 230-33.
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others' trade.49  And selective price reductions may probe competitive market
response before a lowering of price across the board.5"
Disparities in sellers' and buyers' power make the line between predatory
price cutting and aggressive competition thin.5 1 Business correspondence may
reveal a seller's predatory intent.5 2 Where such facts are absent, however, the
depth and frequency of price cuts and, most important, the vitality of remain-
ing competition must make the necessary distinction. 3
In some industrial markets 54 operating short of full capacity selective price
cuts remain the sole effective force of competition. A small number of sellers
with heavy capital investments may supply the entire output of a standardized
industrial commodity.r 5 Price changes by producers have minor effects on
total demand. Cement, for example, makes up a small part of the cost of the
end product in which it is used. A cut in cement prices, therefore, is not likely
to increase proportionately overall demand for cement.56 But because industrial
49. EDWA1RS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 162 (1949).
50. Ibid.
51. Id. at 170. And see WILcox at 6: "The test of predation is intent, but the price
cutter's purpose is known only to himself, is only to be inferred by others . . . Every
act of competition is designed to attract business to one competitor rather than another
and, to that extent, to eliminate the latter from the market. The line beyond which such
activity is to be denounced as predatory is not an easy one to draw."
52. Cf. E. B. Muller v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
53. EDWARDS, INTAINING COMPETITION 170-71 (1949). Cf. F & A Ice Cream Co.
v. Arden Farms Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC. %162,848 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
In determining whether a low price was quoted for a predatory purpose, relevant factors
are "the suddenness of the price change, its relation to previous prices charged by the
merchant or by others in the field in the particular locality or elsewhere, the existence
or non-existence of new economic factors relating to cost of production, demand for the
article, seasonal or other, the consequent need for expansion or contraction of the field
for the particular merchandise, and other factors, financial or economic, which might or
might not warrant a precipitate reduction in price." Id. at page 64,494.
54. For economic surveys of basically non-competitive markets, see BAIN, PRICING,
DISTRIUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT 176-221 (1948); MIL.R at 172-93; FELLNER, CoM-
PETITION AMONG THE FEW (1950). See also Comment, Price Systems and Competition:
The Basing Point Issues, 58 YAI.E L.J. 426, 430-43 (1949); NELSON & KEIM at 32-37.
And cf. Bain, Price and Production Policies, in A SuRVEY OF CONTEMPORARY EcoNoMIcs
129, 152 et seq. (Ellis Ed. 1948) for emphasis on institutional behavior, rather than "mutu-
ally recognized interdependence," as the basis of price rigidity, and consequent criticism
of economists' "flight from reality to calculus." For similar emphasis, consult ARNoLD,
BormNEcxs OF BusiNEss (1940) ; NOtRSE, PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY (1944).
55. Markets with few sellers, i.e. "oligopolies," are common in American industry.
For statistics and description, see Wm.cox at 113-20; FELI.NER, COMPETITION AMONG TE
FEW 18 (1950) ; MI.ER at 177.
56. The cost of cement does not exceed 16% of the final cost of the products in which
it is used. Comment, 58 YAL.E L.J. 426, 431 n.17 (1949). If, for example, the price of
cement is 15% of the cost of buildings, a 20% cut in cement prices would reduce building
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buyers of cement or glucose are unmoved by labels or slogans, price is the
focus of each individual transaction.57 Accordingly, one seller's price conces-
sion booms his sales at the expense of all others who must retaliate or leave the
field. 5s But because any price reductions are quickly matched, all sellers lose
out in the end. Each ends up with his initial market share, but at lower prices.'"
Furthermore, price reductions may "spoil the market"-it becomes difficult to
raise prices again. And paradoxically, price cuts interpreted as portending
still further reductions may actually result in the loss of sales.30 In such
markets price competition is vermin, and sellers readily co-operate to stamp
it out.6' Follow-the-leader pricing and industry-wide formulas establish a
"sticky" price and enable sellers quickly to spot deviations from it.6 2 Unused
plant capacity, however, presses on each seller and creates mutual uncertainty.
3
As pressure develops, selected buyers with large orders may receive discreet
concessions. Each concealed discrimination is a crack that tends to spread and
crumble the entire artificial price wall.
6 4
costs only 37. Neither the demand for buildings nor the "derived" demand for cement
necessarily would rise noticeably.
"In general, the individual seller can expect to benefit from a price cut only if the
volume of his sales is thereby increased by an amount sufficient to augment his net profits
or reduce his loss. This postulates a very considerable increase in consumption as price
declines-e.g., a high degree of elasticity of demand. There are many industries in which
consumption does not increase materially when price declines-i.e., demand is notably
inelastic. This is true particularly of those industries whose product is merely a minor
component part of a finished article manufactured by others, of whos total cost they com-
prise but a small part. Thus the consumption of cement depends upon the rate of con-
struction activity, the demand for spark plugs is dependent upon the sale or use of
automobiles.... Consequently an isolated change in the price of such commodities cannot
be expected to exercise any appreciable influence upon their demand." NELSON &
zinmI at 35-36.
57. BAIN at 211; NELsO N & KE Im at 35 n.40.
58. BAIN at 210.
59. BAIN at 210-11; Comment, 58 YAL.E LJ. 426, 432 (1949).
60. NELSON & KEnI at 36; Comment, 58 YAE L.J. 426, 432 n.19 (1949), citing NEAL.,
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND Pmicn FLEXIILITY 82 (1942).
61. Comment, 58 YALE L.. 426, 452-53 (1949) ; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 975 (1949);
MILEaR at 186-88; BAIN at 213-14. For discussion of restrictive activities of trade associa-
tions, see Wncox at 225-58. And cf. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948);
Comment, supra, at 448; Fly, supra note 46, at 1348, 1360-1, 1368.
62. MILLER at 376-77; BAIN at 184-88.
63. Cf. note 36 supra.
64. "Sporadic, unsystematic discrimination is one of the most powerful forces of
competition in modern industrial markets. Like a high wind, it seizes on small openings
and crevices in an 'orderly' price structure and tears it apart." Adelman, supra note 46,
at 1331-2.
For the competitive importance of sporadic price "chiseling," see also CLARX,
AL.TERxATV To SERBUo 80 (1948) ; Burns, supra note 10, at 317-18; Fly, supra note 46,
at 1368. And see note 183 infra.
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PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT.65
The Federal Trade Commission enforces Robinson-Patman's prolix and
65. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946). For recent useful overall
surveys of the Act, consult Haslett, Price Discriminations and their Justifications under
the Robinson-Patiman Act, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 450 (1948); Crowley, Equal Price Treat-
incnt undcr The Robinson-Patinan Act, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306 (1947).
Concurrent with the legislative course that resulted in the enactment of the Patman
bill, an independent penal price discrimination measure was introduced by Sens. Borah
and Van Nuys. In a perple-ing legislative compromise, the Borah-Van Nuys bill was
enacted together with the Patman bill and became § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. See
ZoRN & FELDMAN at 52-54. The section has been criticized as "a grotesque manifestation
of the scissors and paste pot method of drafting a potentially drastic criminal statute."
Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Pahnan Act be Amended?, CCH ROBiNSoN-PATMA-N
Acr SYmposium 141, 153 (1948).
Section 3 makes it a crime for any person (1) to be a party to, or assist in, a sale or
contract to sell which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser,
in that any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to the
purchaser over and above those available to competitors in respect to a sale of goods
of like grade, quality, and quantity; (2) to sell, or contract to sell, goods at lower prices
in one part of the United States than in another for the purpose of destroying competition,
or eliminating a competitor; (3) to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low
price for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. 49 STAT.
1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1946). For discussion, see Rose, supra note 8, at 228-35.
Actions under § 3 are brought by the Department of Justice or treble damage claimants,
since the FTC's jurisdiction is limited to issuing cease and desist orders. Id. at 228 n.29.
Section 3 lay dormant for over ten years. Several cases adverted to § 3 treble damage
suits but rendered no decisions. See Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743,
750-52, 757 (1947); Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 131 F.2d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39,
43 (E.D. Tex. 1942). But § 3 treble damage suits are spreading rapidly. Predatory
price cutting is the typical allegation. Only two § 3 claims appear to have gone to judg-
ment on the merits. Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950) (Recovery
denied. No geographic price variations nor destroying competition as "moving cause"
of price reductions. Plaintiffs themselves are illegally maintaining prices) ; Goodman
& Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949) (Recovery
denied. Insufficient causal connection beween unreasonably low prices and injury). Cf.
Moore v. Mead Sv. Co., 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950), 51 CoL. L. RaV. 1523 (1951)
(Recovery denied. Plaintiff fiing prices in "pari delicto") ; Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice
& Cold Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 953 (1950)
(Recovery denied. No elimination of competition in course of interstate commerce);
Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (same). And cf. Gordon, Wolf,
Cowen Co. v. Indep. Halvah & Candies, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (motion to
dismiss on grounds of § 3's unconstitutionally vague criminal standards denied) ; F & A
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEc. 62,848 (S.D.
Cal. 1951) (§ 3 price cutting clause held constitutional); Hipps v. Bowman Dairy Co.,
id. at 162,859 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (§ 3 price discrimination clause held constitutional and
enforceable by treble damage suit); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (motion to dismiss, because § 3 not a part of antitrust laws
enforceable by treble damage suit, denied). Future denial of recovery on "pari delicto"
grounds is doubtful. The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs' antitrust violations
do not shield defendants from Sherman Act treble damage liability. KIefer-Stewart Co.
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ambiguous 66 clauses. The law forbids, in short, price discrimination that may
injure "competition with" sellers, buyers, or their customers. 67 Rebates to
buyers for their own account 68 and discriminatory allowances or services"" are
illegal regardless of their effects on competition. The Act, however, permits
legal justification of discriminatory prices by a seller's cost savings 70 or good
faith meeting of competition. 71 The FTC, aided by private complaints, has
proceeded against hundreds of offenders. 72 And private litigants have brought
numerous other violations before the courts.
73
v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Only one § 3 charge by the Department of
Justice is reported. In U.S. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 89 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ill. 1949),
defendant was charged with contracting for secret rebates to A & P. Defendant moved
to dismiss the indictment on grounds that § 3's vague standard of criminality violated
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Court was "beset with doubts" of the section's
constitutionality, but declined to decide constitutional questions on motion. Cf. U.S. v.
Borden Co., CCH TRADE REG. RE'. '48-'51 DEC. 61,351 (companion case voluntarily
dismissed by the government on May 24, 1951). Almost 15 years after its enactment,
§ 3 is still in flux. Broadly interpreted, it may become a plaintiffs' bonanza.
66. "[T]he cause of the trouble is the [Robinson-Patman] Act itself, which is vague
and general in its wording and which cannot be translated with assurance into any
detailed set of guiding yardsticks." Clark, J., in Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, CCH TRADE
REG. REP. '48-'51 DEc. 162,847 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340
U.S. 231 (1951), discussed at pp. 965-72 inf ra.
67. The relevant part of Section 2(a) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, . . . either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,... where the effect of such
discrimination may be sustantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them". 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
68. See pp. 957-58 infra.
69. See pp. 959-61 infra.
70. See pp. 961-65 inf ra.
71. See pp. 965-72 inf ra.
72. As of June 1950, the FTC had adjudicated: under §2(a)-124 cases, §2(c)-
146 cases, §2(d)--60 cases, §2(e)-41 cases, §2(f)-11 cases. Statement of James
M. Mead, Chairman, FTC, to the Watchdog Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce of the U.S. Senate, August 24, 1950, Appendix F, pp. 3-4
(mimeographed copy in Yale Law Library).
One FTC Commissioner has sharply attacked the Commission's reliance on private
complaints. Count I of Commissioner Mason's complaint against the FTC avers "that
the FTC, unable to prosecute everyone in the business world, picks its cases by the
fan mail system; that litigation depends on private complaint rather than public interest."
Mason, The FTC's Search for a New Role 5 (Address before the Boston Conference
on Distribution, October 17, 1950, mimeographed copy in Yale Law Library).
73. Violations of §2(a): Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985
(S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) ($225,000 treble damage award
for injury by discriminatory volume prices and freight equalization); Chicago Sugar
Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
948 (1950) (contract option differential between manufacturers and distributors held
reasonable and lawful classification); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Con-
struction Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943) (differen-
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Recent cases highlight the dangerous effects of a statute that regulates a
competitive economy but perverts the economics of competition. Because the
universals of the statute have swallowed up original aims, decisions strike into
all sectors of industry. No coherent pattern of business regulation emerges.
The cases' undercurrent of protecting some competitors, however, increasingly
conflicts with public policy of competition itself.
Functional discounts 74 and resale price maintenance: The Standard Oil
(Indiana) Case."h Standard discriminated between independent distributors
and controlled retail outlets in the Detroit area.76 The retailers took tank-
wagon delivery and paid Standard's posted tank-wagon price per gallon.
Standard, however, charged the 1Y2 cent cheaper tank-car price to distributors
with bulk storage and delivery equipment who took tank-car lots.77 These
tial between brick price and price of brick in lump sum construction contract not
unlawful); Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939) (refusals to
sell do not violate § 2(a); there must be actual sales at discriminatory prices);
Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949),
rev'd on other grounds, CCHI TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEc. 62,895 (8th Cir. 1951)
(injury by discriminatory volume prices and freight equalization entitles to treble
damages); Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890
(D. Mass. 1949) (contracting at discriminatory prices creates no §2(a) cause of
action; there must be two actual sales); McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Machine
Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948) (commission-basis store manager has good
cause of action against rival store granting secret concessions to buyers; but suit
dismissed for lack of proved injury to plaintiff); Lewis v. Shell Oil, 50 F. Supp. 547
(N.D. Ill. 1943) (Contract made in plaintiff's state and delivery from bulk plant in
same state. Suit dismissed because discrimination must be in interstate commerce);
Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Ill. 1941) (plaintiff,
although not a purchaser, has treble damage cause of action for injuries caused him by
seller's discriminatory prices to plaintiff's competitors). Cf. Bruce's Juices v. American
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947) (discriminatory volurne prices held no § 3 defense to suit
for payment of purchase price of goods).
For treble damage suits under sections 2(c), (d), and (e), see notes 198 and
210 infra.
74. For legal discussion of functional discounts and case citations, consult Shnider-
man, supra note 25, passin; Van Cise, Fwnctional Prices, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN
Acr SYmposium 89 (1947). Cf. Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, CCH TRADE REa. REP. '48-'51
DEc. fI62,847 (2d Cir. 1951).
75. Standard Oil Co., 41 FTC 263 (1945), modified, 43 FTC 56 (1946), modified
and af'd, Standard Oil v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds,
340 U.S. 231 (1951). For critical analysis of substantive aspects of the case, see
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HAv. L. REv. 27, 60-74 (1949); Note,
The Swinging Door-Or How to Obey One Antitrust Law by Violating Another, 59
YALE L.J. 158 (1949). The meeting competition defense is discussed at pp. 965-72
infra.
76. 41 FTC 263, 272 (1945). Standard sold to about 350 retail outlets in the Detroit
area. It owned and leased 200 stations and had requirements contracts with the rest.
77. Id. at 272-73.
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resold some gasoline to other independent outlets and marketed some through
their own pumps.78
The FTC found two vices in the transaction. One tank-car buyer resold to
an independent outlet below Standard's posted tank-wagon price.70 This
outlet cut its prices and "diverted business" from others.80 Another tank-car
customer cut prices to the public at his own pumps.8 ' This enabled him, too,
to "divert large amounts of business" to himself, with "'resultant injury" to
other retailers.8 2 Some retailers lost business. This, according to the FTC,
was the statutory injury to "competition."
The FTC ordered Standard to prevent further injuries in two ways. Buyers
who resold to retailers below Standard's posted price could no longer get the
lower tank-car rates.8 3 And integrated customers, who took tank-car delivery
and performed storage but marketed directly to the public, had to pay the
same price as "other retailers." 84 To avoid violation of its order, the FTC
advised, Standard could easily police resale prices. If Standard threatened to
cut off distributors not adhering to posted prices, they would surely stay in
line.8 5 Standard, moreover, owned dealers' filling station insignia and could
remove them if further persuasion was needed.88
On review, the Seventh Circuit upheld the order with minor modifications.8 7
Standard now would violate the order only when it knew or should have known
that distributors undercut its posted tank-wagon prices.88 Anyway, the Court
added, Standard could avoid all trouble by selling at a uniform price to all
customers 89
The Supreme Court never reached the order's merits. Standard argued
that no seller "in his right mind" familiar with antitrust law would establish a
resale price maintenance system. 0 The FTC disagreed. Standard could law-
fully refuse to sell, and distributors would then naturally comply.91 The Su-
78. Id. at 272-74.
79. Id. at 276.
80. Ibid.
81. Id. at 275.
82. Id. at 276.
83. Standard Oil Co., 43 FTC 56, 58 (1946). Modified order to cease and desist,
par. 6.
84. Ibid., par. 5.
85. FTC Brief, p. 95, Standard Oil v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
86. Id. at p. 96.
87. Standard Oil v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
88. Id. at 217.
89. Ibid.
90. Brief for Standard, pp. 46-47, Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
91. FTC Brief, p. 71. The FTC relied on U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919),
a case never overruled but considered moribund. Comment, 58 YAIE L.J. 1121, 1129
(1949). Justice Frankfurter, on oral argument, considered the case "rather under a cloud."
18 U.S.L. WEEK: 3211 (1950). But Colgate now has a new lease on life. Adams-Mitchell
Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48'51 DEC. 62,856 (2d Cir.
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preme Court was obviously perturbed. Justice Jackson demanded to know
whether the Government was "trying to enforce two conflicting legislative
policies" and what the competition was that the Robinson-Patman Act pro-
tected.92 To date the answers remain in limbo. By a decision that turned on
one vote the Court reversed a Seventh Circuit holding that the meeting of
competition defense did not apply.93 Hence there was no need to adjudge the
substantive merits of FTC's order. The case was remanded for further findings.
Though this particular FTC proceeding may discreetly die,94 the legal risks
of market "straddling" created by the FTC action may destroy actively com-
peting distributors. Under the order, whose merits the Supreme Court opinion
left unscathed, functional discounts to buyers likely to undercut sellers' posted
prices are illegal. 5 As a result, "straddling" sellers must control their middle-
men's prices to escape a Robinson-Patman Act proceeding. But section 1 of
the Sherman Act condemns horizontal resale price maintenance agreements
that end competition between direct seller and distributors. 96 In addition,
1951). And see Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951). See
notes 96 and 97 infra.
92. 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3210 (1950). While the Standard case was pending on appeal,
the Antitrust Division was preparing complaints against Pacific Coast oil majors charging
resale price maintenance as part of a Sherman Act offense. The complaint against
Standard Oil of California, Shell Oil Co., and The Texas Co. alleged dominance of the
industry perpetuated "by refusing to sell their gasoline . . . to any wholesale or retail
distributor who fails or refuses to follow the prices fixed by them." A similar complaint
was filed against Sun Oil Co. in Pennsylvania. Rose, supra note 8, at 248 nn.125, 126.
The Antitrust Division prosecutes what the FTC prescribes. This "swinging door"
paradox and the refusal of the Attorney-General's office to appear in support of the FTC
order, 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3210 (1950), points up the Court's dilemma. See also notes
237 and 265 infra.
93. Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). For full discussion of the decision,
see pp. 965-72 infra.
94. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on January 8, 1951. As of July 10,
1951, the FTC had taken no further action in the Standard Oil case. Communication to
YALE LAw JouRNAL from Bureau of Antimonopoly, FTC, in Yale Law Library.
95. Paragraph 6 of the modified cease and desist order prohibits discounts "where such
jobber or wholesaler, to the knowledge of the respondent, or under such circumstances as
are reasonably calculated to impute knowledge to the respondent, resells such gasoline or
intends to resell the same to any of its said retailer-customers at less than respondent's
posted tank-wagon price. . . ." 173 F.2d 210, 217 (1949).
96. E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
The Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946), does not change this
result. Miller-Tydings expressly excludes resale price maintenance agreements between
sellers in competition with each other from its protective umbrella. Since both Standard
and the distributors resell to retail outlets, any price maintenance agreement between them
would be "horizontal," and therefore illegal. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 n.1 (1951); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 158, 161 n.15 (1949). The
Schweginann case, holding non-signer provisions of a state "fair trade" law unenforceable,
sounds an advance requiem for all resale price fixing contracts. For conflicting interpreta-
tions of Schwegzan's effects on "intrastate" resale price maintenance, compare Bulova
Watch Co., Inc. v. S. Klein On The Square, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC.
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policing and cutting off middlemen to enforce tacit price control may violate
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.9 7 Consequently, a seller who
markets directly and through distributors risks prosecution under contra-
dictory laws. To avoid this dilemma he may discontinue one distribution
channel. Most likely the independent distributor, a powerful competitive lever
in seller-dominated markets, 98 will be eliminated.
Classification of integrated buyers as retailers " rivets dominant sellers'
bargaining position. Some buyers invest in functionally integrated distribution
facilities. Prohibiting lower prices to them forces economic discrimination 100
that withholds returns from their investment. Economies of their integra-
tion are siphoned into sellers' pockets. This punishes integrated buyers who
typically trigger active retail price competition. 1°1 Placid retail markets exert
no downward pressure on stable sellers' prices. The FTC's buyer classification
policy, therefore, both curtails competition at the retail level and insulates
sellers' prices from market forces.
Quantity and volume discounts,102 and the prima fade case: The Morton
Salt Case.1°3 Morton Salt Company granted discriminatory discounts in mar-
162,854 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951), with Rothbaum v. R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., CCH TRADE
REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC. 162,855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951). See note 97 infra for revived
possibilities of resale price control enforced by refusals to sell.
97. E.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (requesting customers
to report price cutters, customer blacklists, detecting price cutters by agents and numbering
packages) ; Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926) (procuring agents and
retailers to report price cutters). But cf. U.S. v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (refusal
to sell to dealers deviating from "suggested" prices and securing assurances of com-
pliance from customers does not violate Sherman Act) ; accord, Adams-Mitchell Co. v.
Cambridge Distributing Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC. ff 62,856 (2d Cir. 1951).
The decision "breathes new life into the decrepit doctrine of United States v. Colgate,
250 U.S. 300, thereby condoning a form of price-fixing which will simplify evasion of the
anti-trust laws." Id. at page 64,517 (dissenting opinion). See notes 91 and 92 supra. And
see Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) (agreement between
affiliated sellers to refuse to sell in order to maintain maximum prices violates Sherman
Act, but each "acting individually perhaps might have refused" to sell). See generally,
Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949).
98. See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27, 62 (1949).
99. Paragraph five of the cease and desist order prohibits lower prices to "any dealer,
jobber, or wholesaler on such gasoline sold ... at retail". Standard Oil Co., 43 FTC
56, 58 (1946).
100. See note 11 supra; Adelman, supra note 98, at 63-64.
101. Comment, 58 YALE L.J 1121, 1122-3 (1949). "Defensive" discriminators may
refuse to sell to integrated buyers altogether. The integrated buyer can get a supply from
other distributors, but at a prohibitive price. Id. at 1123 rL12, 1133-4. Cf. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
102. For legal survey and citations, see Haslett, The Validity of Quantity Discounts,
CCH ROBISON-PATMAN AcT SymPosium 26 (1948). And cf. FTC v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
103. Morton Salt Co., 39 FTC 35 (1944), modified, 40 FTC 388 (1945), set aside,
Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1947), rev'd and remanded, 334 U.S. 37
(1948), modified, 3 CCH TRADE REG. Rzp. 1 14,095 (FTC 1948). For comment, see
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keting table salt. Carload-quantity buyers received a 6% discount. 04 Small
buyers pooled purchases to qualify for carload discounts, and in one year
99.9o of sales was made in carload lots. 10 5 A volume schedule based on annual
aggregates granted further discounts up to 10o. 106 Only 4 chain stores
obtained both carload and maximum volume discounts.
10 7
The FTC never made a legal distinction between quantity and volume dis-
counts. All were treated as quantity discounts. 08 That 99.9o of sales were
made in carload quantities was immaterial. 10 9 Because the Robinson-Patman
Act aimed to "reach price discriminations in their incipiency," it was not neces-
sary to show actual injury to competition." Nevertheless, a 2000 page record
was built. The facts were that some grocers received discounts, others did
not. A parade of grocers as expert witnesses testified that if one grocer had
to pay 10 cents more for a case of salt than his competitor, doubtless his
"competitive position" would be impaired."-' But the FTC did not rest on
expert opinion. One wholesaler, for example, paid 15 cents more for a case
of salt than A & P and was forced to cut his profit margin 5 cents to enable his
customers to compete." 2
The FTC concluded that those who received discounts enjoyed a substantial
competitive advantage."13  holesalers not obtaining discounts had to choose
between reselling at competitive prices which cut into their profits, or charging
higher prices that lost their sales. 114 And retailers buying from non-discount
wholesalers paid prices that prohibited competition between them and chain
stores." r' The FTC held, therefore, that Morton's discounts might substantially
lessen competition and "injure, destroy, and prevent competition" between
those who received discounts and those who did not.116
The cease and desist order revamps Morton's price policy. Morton's dis-
counts were geared to quantity and volume purchases. The FTC substitutes
pricing according to functional labels.117 Chain stores, their integrated func-
Zlinkoff & Barnard, Basing Points and Quantity Discounts, 48 COL. L. REV. 985, 1020
(1948); Note, 27 N.C.L. REv. 126 (1948).
104. A case containing 24 paclages was sold at $1.60 in less than carload lots and at
$1.50 in carload lots. 40 FTC 388, 394 (1945).
105. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 48 n.17, 60 (1948).
106. 40 FTC 388, 394-95 (1945).
107. Id. at 395.
108. See, e.g., the statement of contested issues, FTC Brief, p. 3, Morton Salt Co. v.
FTC, 162 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1947).
109. Id. at pp. 26-27.
110. Id. at p. 26.
111. Id. at pp. 33-35. 51 witnesses were so interrogated. Morton Salt Brief, p. 33,
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
112. FTC Brief, pp. 36-37, Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1947).
113. 40 FTC 388, 396 (1945).
114. Id. at 397.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Id. at 398.
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tions disregarded, are considered retailers.118 Morton may not differentiate
in price among competing wholesalers or among competing retailers.11  And,
an obvious block to chain "retailers'" buying power, a chain "retailer," under
the order, may not get lower prices than any wholesaler with whose customers
he competes.120 To comply with the order and retain its chain store customers
Morton for all practical purposes must institute a one-price policy. This opens
several marketing alternatives. Morton may quote identical prices to whole-
salers, chain stores, and small retailers. In that event there would be no dis-
crimination within a class, or between wholesalers and chain stores. Alterna-
tively, Morton might sell at a uniform price to chain stores and wholesalers
and discontinue small retail accounts. Finally, Morton could avoid the effect
of the order by dealing exclusively with chains.
The Seventh Circuit set the order aside.121 It thought that the FTC had
confused injury to competition with the normal effects of differences resulting
from larger quantity purchases.122 judge Minton dissented. He deemed the
discounts discriminatory per se unless justified by cost savings. 23 Besides,
"[t] he fact of the discrimination itself... would have supported an inference
that the effect may be to lessen competition.'
1 24
The Supreme Court reversed. 25 The avowed purpose of the Robinson-
Patman Act was to "protect competition from all price differentials except
those based in full on cost savings.' 1 2 6 The FTC's 2000 page record had
proved too much. It had shown only the obvious, "that the competitive oppor-
tunities of certain merchants were injured" when they had to pay substantially
more for salt than their competitors.127 There was no need of testimony to
prove the self-evident: "there is a 'reasonable possibility' that competition
may be adversely affected" when like goods are sold to some customers sub-
stantially cheaper than to their competitors. 2 s
118. Cf. id. at 397.
119. Par. (a) and (b), cease and desist order, ibid. A five-cent spread permissible if
it did not "tend" to injure competition was eliminated upon remand from the Supreme
Court. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 14,095 (FTC 1948). Cf. Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 1 62,847 (2d Cir. 1951).
120. Par. (c), cease and desist order, 40 FTC 388, 398, prohibits "selling . . . to any
retailer at prices lower than prices charged wholesalers whose customers compete with
such retailers."
121. Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1947).
122. Id. at 957.
123. Id. at 959.
124. Id. at 960.
125. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. at 46-47.
128. Id. at 50. Cf. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), clarified, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946) (where injury to
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Two justices dissented in part.1 29 They considered the "possibility" criterion
fatal to any discount the FTC chose to attack.' 30 Moreover, there was a
definite difference between the volume discount for which only 1%o of buyers
qualified and the carload discount under which 99.9% of sales were made.' 31
"Quota" discounts gave an arbitrary advantage to large buyers and were
illegal.132 But carload discounts, after all, passed on the advantages of low
cost distribution to the consumer and should be upheld.'
33
Implementation of Robinson-Patman objectives demands the dissenters'
distinction between carload and volume discounts. Chain stores were the
statute's target. Quantity discounts factually available to pooling buyers, how-
ever, benefit not only chain stores but all buyers of economical quantities.
Volume discounts, on the other hand, are the heart of the chain store problem
that the Act aimed to resolve. In Morton Salt, only 4 large chains took the
annual volume of 50,000 cases of salt that qualified for the top discount bracket.
These discounts were clearly out of individual small buyers' reach and con-
ferred cumulative competitive advantages on the chains. Illegality of such
volume discounts, despite possible harm to effective competition, makes sense
in terms of the statutory objectives. Illegality of pooled quantity discounts
does not.
The theory of the decision insulates high-cost distribution systems from
competitive streamlining. Order-pooling to obtain carload discounts leads to
direct dealing that splits middleman functions between seller and buyer. As a
result, a wholesaler profit is short-circuited and distribution costs reduced.
The FTC's functional straitjacket preserves middlemen from competitive dis-
placement by short-channel marketing. 34 Needed development of lower-cost
competition among sellers is charged, proof of price discrimination alone makes out a
prina facie case shifting the burden of justification to the discriminator). The case is
cited with approval in the Morton Salt case, 334 U.S. 37, 45 n.13 (1947). This doctrine
apparently applies equally to cases where injury to competing buyers is alleged. See id.
at 45; FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510, 515 (Zd Cir. 1951); Russellville
Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, CCH TRADE R.G. REP. '48-'51 DEC. f162,895 (8th Cir. 1951).
129. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 55 (1948) (partially dissenting opinion).
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Frankfurter joined, wrote this opinion.
130. Id. at 58.
131. Id. at 59-61.
132. Id. at 58-61.
133. Ibid.
134. "The unfortunately wide differentiation between wholesale and retail prices, and
the sharp separation between wholesale and retail markets, may be regarded as a vestigial
remainder of the mercantilist system (as a colossal system of restraint upon trade),
which has only recently begun to be undermined." SiMoNs, EcONomIc POLICY FOR A
FREE Socinrx 72 (1948 ed.). See also Edwards, The Struggle for Control of Distribution,
1 J. MARKETING 212 (1937).
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distribution '35 is impaired. Competitive public policy should not preserve
wholesalers against the inroads of competition. 136
The Morton Salt Case and its sequel also outlaw buyer-coerced price reduc-
tions. Morton Salt orders the seller to discontinue volume concessions to large
buyers. The reverse side of the coin, Automatic Canteen,137 directly prohibits
the large buyer from forcing concessions.'3 8 Morton's discounts injured some
buyers' "competitive position." Automatic's forced concessions 139 had the
opposite effect. Price reductions "diverted business" from sellers who refused
to lower prices and thus injured "competition" among sellers.
14
0
135. It costs more to distribute goods than to make them. In 1939, marketing costs
acccounted for 50.57 of the total cost of distribution and production of goods. CONVERSE
& HuEGY, ELEMENTS OF MARKETING 693-4 (3d rev. ed. 1947); STEWART & DEWHURST,
DOES DISTRmUTION COST Too MucH? 101, 105-6 (1939). And see SIMONS, op. cit.
supra note 134, at 71: "[O]ur vaunted efficiency in production is dissipated extravagantly
in the wastes of merchandising."
136. "The Robinson-Patman Act ... is a part of the struggle between the older
and newer organizations in distribution in which the older group sought protection from
the state presumably because it was not prepared to rely on the outcome of competition."
Burns, in The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust Laws: A Symposium, 39 AZI. EcoN.
REv. 689, 695 (1949). Cf. Testimony of R. N. Rowe, Vice-President of the U.S. Whole-
sale Grocers' Ass'n, before the House Select Committee on Small Business: "[W]e would
like to see more zeal and loyalty for the Robinson-Patman Act on the part of some elements
in Congress, in the Justice Department, and the Federal Trade Commission. These
elements seem to have gone off the reservation to follow the will-o'-the wisp of something
termed 'hard competition' ... and the alleged conflicting theories and content of the
Sherman Act and the... Robinson-Patman Act .... All this talk leaves us cold."
[Q.] Your Association feels that the Robinson-Patman Act is more or less [its]
Magna Carta. .?
Mr. Rowe: Oh, yes, that is correct." Hearings before Select Committee on Small
Business, Functional Operation of the FTC, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1950).
137. Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 3 CCH TnADE REc. REP. 1f 14,398 (FTC
1950), review pending 7th Cir., id. at 1 14,998.
138. The charge was brought under § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which reads:
"[I]t shall be unlawful . . . knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by" §2. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1946). For
general discussion, see Forkner, The Significance of Section 2(f), CCH ROBINSON-
PATiAAN AcT SYMPOSIum 66 (194) ; Howrey, The Buyer and the Prima Facie Case,
id. at 87.
The order to cease and desist forbids Automatic "from knowingly inducing or
accepting a price from a seller known by it . . . to be below the net price . . . to other
customers, where the seller is competing with any other seller for respondent's business,
or where respondent is competing with other customers of the seller." Automatic Canteen
Co. of America, 3 CCH TRADE REG. RP. 14,398 (FTC 1950).
139. Automatic knew of prices to other buyers and "employed various means to
induce lower prices." It informed prospective seller of the prices and terms of sale which
"would be acceptable to it without comideration or inquiry as to whether such suppliers
could justify such price on a cost basis or whether it was being offered to other customers
of the supplier." FTC opinion, ibid. (emphasis added). Cf. note 184 infra.
140. "Any discrimination ...will divert business from any manufacturer or jobber
who does not grant such price discrimination to [one] who does grant them." Automatic,
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Both decisions sterilize powerful buyers and shield monopolistic sellers'
prices from assault. Were small sellers without alternative market outlets
exploited, antitrust policy should be concerned. 141 In the Morton Salt Case,
however, chain stores beat down the salt industry's collusive prices.' 42 And
Automatic Canteen cracked the prices of brand-insulated sellers such as the
Wrigley Company. Preventing buyers' attacks on concerted or powerful
sellers' prices is misdirected effort. Only strong and aggressive buyers can
loosen concentrated sellers' stranglehold on price.14 3
Powerful distributors are far less dangerous than powerful manufacturers
to competitive public policy.144 Large traders combine economies of scale with
bargaining coercion of size. True, concessions to size alone confer a cumulative
advantage in subsequent market operations that could jeopardize the existence
of smaller rivals.14 i But distribution outlets typically require lower capital
investment and simpler technology than finished-goods production units. Com-
petitors' ease of entry forestalls monopoly.1 46 Large distributors who, con-
sequently, resell under competitive conditions pass on at least part of their
concessions to the consumer. Unlike concentrated manufacturers, they cannot
restrict purchases or sales to manipulate price.147 When sellers are not atom-
ized, powerful buyers are a needed offset. Small producers are not likely to
therefore, "injured competition between manufacturers" who did grant discriminatory
prices and those who did not. FTC opinion, ibid.
141. Cf. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)
(conspiracy among 3 sugar refiners, the only market outlet for beet growers, to pay
uniform price for beets held Sherman Act treble damage cause of action).
142. Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943) (18 producers
combined to monopolize and suppress competition in the sale of salt by price fixing, cur-
tailing production, and exchanging price lists and information on terms of sales).
143. For detailed exposition of this theme, see Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study
it; Applied Economic Theory, 63 Q. J. EcoN. 238 (1949). See also Note, Trouble Begins
in the "New" Shermtan Act: The Perplexing Story of the A & P Case, 58 YALE L.J. 969
(1949).
144. "[T]here is less to fear from concentrated buying power than from concentrated
control over sales. Though the buyer may exploit the seller, he is likely to be cautious
in using the types of restrictions that are most harmful to the general public." EDWARDS,
MAINTAINING COMPETITION 96 (1949).
145. Id. at 160-61. But cf. Burns, supra note 136, at 695. Burns contends that though
there may be some truth in the argument that large buyers get advantages not only from.
cost-reducing opportunities but from market control opportunities as well, the argument
has never been satisfactorily documented. In practice, he argues, it is impossible to
draw a line between sources of possible price advantage.
146. Factors forestalling monopoly in distribution are: low capital requirements,
cheap quarters, cheap equipment available at second-hand, abundant stocks of goods,
numerous and widely scattered sources of supply, easy credit, unskilled labor technology.
Witcox at 57. "Even if all of the larger trading corporations were to combine, it may
be doubted that they could obtain or hold a position of monopoly. There is no obstacle
to entrance to the field." Ibid. See also, PURDY, LINDAHL & CARmT, CORPORATE CON-
cENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 411 (1942) ; Simors, op. cit. supra note 134, at 72.
147. Cf. EDWARDs, MAINTAINING ComBPnTIoN 96 (1949).
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be victimized. Because few of them are dependent on a single buyer, sufficient
alternative outlets for workable competition generally exist.
148
Discrimination between segregated markets and "functional" discounts:
The Champion Spark Plug Case.1 49  Champion Spark Plug Company dis-
criminated between motor vehicle manufacturers and spark plug sales dis-
tributors in its sales of spark plugs. The Ford Motor Company paid 6 cents
per plug used for motor installation and 22 cents for replacement plugs
which it resold.150 Distributors, on the other hand, paid 26 cents for re-
placement plugs.'r' Champion's distinct packaging differentiated plugs for
the two separate end uses. 5 2 And Ford segregated original equipment and
replacement plugs for excise tax purposes. 53 The FTC trial examiner's
recommended cease and desist order forbids Champion to discriminate in
price, unless justified by cost savings, between original equipment and
replacement buyers.'5
4
Price discrimination between segregated markets, not functional discounts,
is the apparent issue of the Champion case. Champion's distinct packaging
for different end uses set up a barrier separating non-competing markets.
Because low-priced plugs installed by Ford did not compete with high-
priced replacement sales, the low 6 cent price did not interfere with Cham-
pion's replacement prices. And since Ford installed and never distributed
original equipment plugs, the low price was not a functional discount seg-
mentizing a distribution channel.'59
The contentions of both FTC trial staff and Champion becloud this issue.
The trial staff ignores the segregated markets, considers the two prices paid by
Ford "fictitious," and claims the "true" price to be their weighted average.'5 8
148. Ibid.
149. Champion Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 3977 (pending). The case has been
briefed and argued before the FTC, and is now before the Commission awaiting decision.
Communication to the YALE LAw JouplxAL from Bureau of Antimonopoly, FTC, dated
July 10, 1951, in Yale Law Library.
For a recent full discussion of the case, see Hansen & Smith, The Champion Case:
What is Competition?, 29 HAv. Bus. REv. No. 3, p. 89 (May 1951).
150. Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint, p. 8 (hereinafter cited as FTC
Brief) ; Trial Examiner's Recommended Decision, p. 10 (hereinafter cited as Recom-
mended Decision).
151. Ibid. See also note 161 infra.
152. FTC Brief, ). 5; Brief for Respondent, p. 25 (hereinafter cited as Champion
Brief) ; Recommended Decision, p. 7.
153. Champion Brief, p. 25.
154. Champion is forbidden from "selling to any purchaser at a price different
from the price charged any other customer who either (a) purchases Champion spark
plugs for original installation in engines or . . . vehicles manufactured for sale and
sold in competition . . . or (b) who purchases Champion spark plugs for resale in
competition. . . ." Recommended Decision, p. 29.
155. Compare discussion at pp. 933-35 supra, with pp. 936-37 supra.
156. FTC Brief pp. 5-6, 10. See also Recommended Decision, pp. 8, 12-13. And
see note 157 infra.
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According to it, Ford paid not 6 cents for original equipment and 22 cents
for replacement plugs, but 16Y cents for all plugs. 157 The 4 cent replace-
ment plug differential between Ford and other replacement buyers merged
into this larger spread and was not argued as a separate issue. Champion,
on the other hand, defends the 6 cent price to Ford as a "functional discount"
immune from any Robinson-Patman challenge.'- 5 The Champion case, it
argues, is a "test case" for American industry on the legality of "functional
prices or trade discounts."'159 It is not.
The FTC has never invalidated genuine functional discounts to distributive
middlemen. Lower prices on goods for resale have consistently passed FTC
scrutiny; dual-function buyers may lawfully obtain lower prices on goods
bought for further distribution. 160 But Champion's discounts to Ford worked
in reverse. The price of plugs for resale was higher than the price of buyer-
used plugs. Obviously there was no compensation of a buyer for relieving a
seller from distributive functions.
The nub of the Champion case lies deeper. Champion's discriminatory
pricing to Ford, the FTC trial staff charged, stunted competition in the spark
plug industry.161 Champion and two other spark plug manufacturers shared
157. FTC Brief, p. 10 n.26. The average is weighted by the respective volume of
installation and replacement plugs bought by Ford.
158. Champion Brief, pp. 9-19.
159. Id. at pp. 1, 7, 9. The injection of the functional discount label into the
Champion case has laid the foundation for spurious generalizations and general confu-
sion. See, e.g., letters from the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, Inc., and
the Motor and Equipment Wholesalers Ass'n, reprinted in FTC Release, December 2,
1950. These letters from distributive middlemen's associations express fears that the
Spark Plug Cases portend an FTC attack on all functional discounts. The Commis-
sion's replies, reprinted: ibid., do not enlighten. Their gist, that functional discounts
as such are not challenged, does not make clear that Champion's discounts to Ford
cannot be compared with functional discounts to middlemen. Moreover, in a companion
case FTC counsel adopted the functional discount label to compare the incomparables.
FTC Reply Brief, pp. 2-5, General Motors and AC Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 5620
(pending) . For resultant extrapolation from the specifics of the Champion case to
the generality of functional discounts, see Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, CCH
AN TrrUST LAW SYMPosIUM 158, 164-65 (1951); Simon: Legal Price Fixing, CCH
ANTITRUST LAW SYmposru 83, 88 (1951) ; Price Discrimination to Meet Competition,
[1950] U. OF ILL. LAW FORUx 575, 576 (1951) ; Hansen & Smith, supra note 149, at 89.
160. Shniderman, supra note 25, at 592-95 and sources there cited; Standard Oil
Co., 43 FTC 56, 58 (1946). And see letter from Director, Bureau of Antimonopoly, FTC,
to General Manager, Motor and Equipment Wholesalers Ass'n, FTC Release, Dec. 2, 1950.
"Your letter expresses a fear that the Commission is moving to outlaw wholesaler
functional discounts as such. You are assured that such a fear is groundless. In my
opinion, the Robinson-Patman Act does not provide for such action. The Commission
has never so moved and in no present case does there appear any such intention.."
(emphasis added).
161. The trial staff secondarily alleged that Champion's discriminatorily low prices
to Ford "prevented Ford from competing with it." FTC Brief, pp. 29-31. In the light
of antitrust policy toward industrial integration as expressed in the recently amended
section 7 of the Clayton Act, for example, the FTC solicitude over Ford's competitive
[Vol. 60 : 929
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
about 80% of the industry's output.16 2  Champion's low original equipment
price to Ford, combined with similar price policies by the other majors, fore-
closed smaller spark plug manufacturers from markets.163 Original equip-
ment sales to the automobile industry were essential to build up replacement
demand.1 64 But small rivals could not meet Champion's six cent price because
they were unable to sell at a loss until a demand for higher-priced replace-
ments developed. 65 And barring them from access to original equipment
markets in turn stymied their replacement sales. The argument is plausible-
but defective.
Champion's pricing policy can achieve a double-barreled economic objec-
tive. Ford's bargaining pressure drives Champion's price down toward
Ford's hypothetical spark plug production costs. Champion must accede
to Ford's coercion or lose Ford as its major market outlet. But Champion
may be unable to sell to everyone at this price and still earn profits. It
can, however, charge a higher price to less powerful buyers and, at the
same time, block Ford from cheap reselling that may usurp the high-price
market. Champion's two-price quotations to segregated spark plug mar-
kets with one stroke serve both ends. Ford buys plugs at two prices that
bracket the price it has economically bargained for.166 And Champion's
distinct packaging of installment and replacement plugs insulates its high-
prowess seems soggy with crocodile tears. Moreover, the implication that Champion's
lower prices bribed Ford not to compete is patently absurd. In a competitive system,
lower prices are typically designed to keep a prospective buyer from buying somewhere
else, or going into business for himself. And compare FTC, REPORT ON THE MOTOR
VEHICLE INDUSTRY 1062 (1940): "To the extent that car manufacturers absorb parts
manufacturers, . . . the car manufacturers tend to restrict free competition in the parts
manufacturing industry."
Thirdly, Champion's price policies allegedly "caused injury to competition between
buyers." FTC Brief, pp. 31-37. Ford's "average price of 163/2 cents" paid for all
plugs it bought gave it a "competitive advantage." Id. at 31-32. Apparently the FTC
staff made no separate argument based on the 4 cent price differential between replace-
ment plug prices to Ford and to distributors, nor did the trial examiner make findings
on this point. The issue of injury to competing buyers is not only the least important in
the case, but seems fully ruled by the Morton Salt case, discussed at pp. 945-51 supra.
For a survey of the allegations and issues in the Champion Case, consult Hansen &
Smith, supra note 149, passim.
162. FTC Brief, p. 4. Recommended Decision, p. 6.
163. FTC Brief, pp. 27-29. The brief recounts unsuccessful attempts by Blue Crown
Spark Plug Co., a small manufacturer, to sell to Deere Co., a tractor manufacturer, and
Kaiser-Frazer Corp. In both cases Blue Crown's bids were rejected as too high and
contracts were awarded to Champion on the basis of six and five cent original equip-
ment bids. Id. at 27-28. Cf. note 166 infra. See also Recommended Decision, p. 13.
164. FTC Brief, p. 29; Recommended Decision, p. 13.
165. FTC Brief, p. 29.
166. Champion's sales of the low-priced original equipment plugs were conditioned
on purchase of higher-priced replacement plugs. FTC Brief, p. 25; Recommended Deci-
sion, p. 8.
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price replacement sales from encroachment by this low-price original equip-
ment buyer.167 But only to the second purpose is the two-price system essen-
tial. The system cannot foreclose smaller spark plug manufacturers from
markets. They, too, could quote separate prices for installment and replace-
ment plugs and compute prospective profits from the sale of both. Competi-
tive weakness may prevent their meeting the prices, single or double, of a
more powerful rival. A uniform price quotation by Champion of 16Y cents
for all plugs may still put them out of the race. If anything does, Champion's
dominant market position in the spark plug industry, not its double price tags,
stifles smaller competitors.
But Robinson-Patman is a dangerously clumsy tool. Prohibiting dis-
crimination between segregated markets can have unforeseen consequences.
Preferential price treatment is common industrial practice' 68 when manufac-
turer-users can threaten to enter manufacturing themselves and deprive a seller
of his market. Ford, for example, suggested this possibility to Champion. 6 2
Because any price above out-of-pocket cost spreads overhead, and manu-
facturer-users do not compete with other sales, sellers may readily accede to
a preferential price policy. Eliminating preferential pricing, however, may
encourage users to integrate upward into manufacture or sellers to merge with
major market outlets.
In the market context of the spark plug industry, this is not unlikely.
Champion, an independent, and two rivals connected with automobile majors
share about 80% of output.170 Because its rivals' major markets seem more
assured, a forced non-discriminatory policy primarily affects Champion.
Ford, if denied preferential prices, may itself integrate into spark plug manu-
facture or swallow up Champion, subject to the limitations of new section 7
of the Clayton Act. In that event, about 30% of the spark plug market
would be lost not only to Champion, but all independent manufacturers as
well. To ensure competition in the spark plug industry, atomization of both
167. Ford, to determine the price at which it will resell, apparently considers the high
price it has paid for replacement plugs as the actual cost to it. Champion Brief, p. 37
n.107. Ford, therefore, does not average low and high purchase price and compete in the
resale market on that basis.
168. See Dun & Bradstreet, Report on the Scale of the Original Equipment Market
and the Prevalence of Differentials between Original Equipment and Trade Customers
(undated), reprinted as Exhibit A, Champion Brief, pp. 39-41. "A recent check . . .
by Dun & Bradstreet showed that 70 per cent of the responding companies who sell
identical products to original equipment and to trade buyers sell at different prices to
these two classes of customers." Id. at 39.
169. FTC Brief, pp. 30-31; Champion Brief, pp. 30-32. Cf. note 161 supra.
170. See note 162 supra. General Motors manufactures its own spark plugs through
its wholly owned AC Spark Plug Division. FTC Brief, p. 3, General Motors Corp. and
AC Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 5620 (pending). Chrysler buys plugs from Electric Auto
Lite Co. Harold E. Talbott is a director of both companies, and Chairman of the Finance
Committee of Electric and Member of the Finance Committee of Chrysler. Champion
Brief, p. 5, citing DnucroR- op Dncros IN THE CITY OF NEw YoRE 626 (1950).
[Vol. 60: 929
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
producers and industrial buyers might prove essential. The Robinson-Patman
uniform price formula, on the other hand, may force further integration in the
already highly integrated automobile industry. While atomization might
set off competition in the spark plug industry, the Robinson-Patman Act
never will.
Selective price discrimination. Predatory price cutting is illegal under
Robinson-Patman and section 5 of the FTC Act.' 71  In E. B. Muller z.
FTC, 72 two sellers controlled the major part of the chicory market and
decided to eliminate their sole competitor, a smaller local seller. Business
correspondence showed their deliberate intent.173  Prices were cut drastically
in the competitor's trade area and kept higher elsewhere. This geographical
price discrimination tended to monopoly and was held illegal under the two
statutes.
74
Mere expansion of trade, however, also conflicts with the Robinson-Patman
Act. In Samuel H. Moss v. FTC17 a seller of rubber stamps charged
varying prices to his accounts. He did not know his competitors' prices
but merely "bid low enough to get the business.' 176 This practice, found
the FTC, had "a tendency to induce purchase of [his] stamps by various
users, and to divert trade to [him] from his competitors."'177 The Second
Circuit affirmed a cease and desist order.178
Price "chiseling" to disturb a price-fixing conspiracy may also be illegal.
The Staley Company allowed favorable purchase options to some buyers.170
171. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce ... are hereby declared unlawful."
52 STAT. 111 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1946). See -also note 65 .stpra for discussion
of Robinson-Patman § 3.
172. 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
173. Id. at 517.
174. E. B. Muller & Co., 33 FTC 24 (1941), af'd, E. B. Muller v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511
(6th Cir. 1944).
175. 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945), clarified, 155 F.2d
1016 (2d Cir. 1946).
176. 148 F.2d 378, 379.
177. Samuel H. Moss, Inc., 36 FTC 640, 648 (1943). Par. 7 of the findings continues:
"The lower prices at which respondent offered for sale and sold its rubber stamps to users
thereof to induce the purchase of respondent's rubber stamps in preference to those of his
competitors had a substantially injurious effect upon competition in the sale and distribu-
tion of rubber stamps . . .and it some instances respondent's prices were such that com-
petitors could not meet such prices without suffering a loss on such business and in one
hzstance a competitor was forced out of business as the result of such acts and practices of
the respondent." Id. at 648-49 (emphasis added). Compare EDWARDS, MAINTAINING
COMMETITIOx 168 (1949): "[I]njury to competition should be defined as injury to the
vitality of competition in the market, not as injury to competition between particular
designated competitors nor as injury to a particular competitor, even though the power
of large buyers is somewhat less drastically reduced by such an interpretation."
178. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 734 (1945), clarified, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946).
179. Staley Mfg. Co., 34 FTC 1362, 1369-70 (1942).
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Apparently collusion in the glucose industry had ended competition180 but not
uncertainty among sellers; some competition still operated underground.
Staley discovered through salesmen and buyers that its "competitors" had
chiseled. It did not stop to verify reports-it also chiseled.' 8 ' The FTC
held this price discrimination illegal, and the Supreme Court agreed. 8 2
Blanket illegality of selective price discrimination cements rigid prices
that antitrust policy aims to loosen. The Staley doctrine relieves colluding
sellers from the burden of hounding and punishing price cutters. 83 The
Robinson-Patman Act does it for them. In this way the law reduces the
sellers' uncertainty that blocks fully effective collusion. Illegality of secret
price cuts in non-competitive markets protects rigid price structures from
chipping by sellers whose self-interest dictates concessions to selected buyers.
When underground competition is prevented, monopolistic prices may last
indefinitely.
Failure to differentiate aggressive competition from predatory price cutting
further petrifies prices.84 The Muller and Moss cases received equal
treatment under the Robinson-Patman Act. But deliberate destruction of
remaining competition and selective price reductions to "divert trade" are
not the same. One ends competition, the other is competition. Prices
reduced to gain new trade symptomize a competitive system's effective
functioning. Prohibiting selective price reductions "low enough to get the
business" comes close to outlawing price competition itself.'83 If a seller
by law must lower all his prices or none, he will hesitate long to lower any.83
180. See note 247 infra.
181. 34 FTC 1362, 1371.
182. Staley Mfg. Co., 34 FTC 1362 (1942), aff'd, FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746 (1945).
183. "[I]n industries in which concerns are relatively few and large, competition often
takes the form of secret price concessions, which are likely to be discriminatory in
character; and the effort to stamp out competition often consists primarily in attempts to
require uniform methods of pricing. Congress probably never contemplated an interpreta-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act under which the only important method by which enter-
prises in an industry actually compete might be interpreted as an injury to competition;
.... Thus the law of price discrimination. . . may be so interpreted as to encourage some
of the methods by which groups of large concerns give force to collusive agreements."
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 167-68 (1949). See also note 64 supra.
184. "Nothing would be gained by using the power of government to deprive large
enterprises of a venturesome spirit or to induce them to compete halfheartedly, with a
regard for the interests of their competitors similar to that which is produced by collusive
agreements. This would be to require semimonopolistic concerns to behave like mo-
nopolies." EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COmIpETITION 156 (1949).
185. Cf. id. at 162; notes 51 and 53 supra.
186. "To the extent to which sellers are required to maintain uniform prices to all
buyers, they are rendered unable to seek particular sales by cutting prices. If they choose
to rely upon price competition as their primary sales argument, they must cut prices
simultaneously to all comers. Naturally, many sellers are far more reluctant to take such
a broad step than to reduce prices on individual transactions. In this way, therefore, anti-
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Per se violations: The "brokerage" clause.8 7  Southgate Brokerage Co.
bought direct from sellers for its own account. Functioning as its own
"broker," it did not need the services of other brokers. Accordingly it
obtained equivalent price concessions. A cease and desist order was af-
firmed.' 8 8  The court acknowledged that direct buying clearly benefited the
sellers.'8 9  But to pay buyers "for doing their own work" was "a mere
gratuity"'19 0 illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act.
The statute's "brokerage clause" tends to create a legal monopoly for
independent brokers that no efficient buying can bypass. 1 1  Statutory
language is vague.19 2  In short, receipt or payment of compensation by
either party to a transaction is illegal except when services are rendered.
Judicial interpretation, however, quickly read the exception out of the
statute.193 Obviously direct buyers relieve a seller from paying intermedi-
discrimination laws may restrict price competition and may favor the emphasis of non-
price factors." NELSON & KIzi at 62.
187. Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act reads: "[lit shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or
to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation,
or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection
with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to
such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such
intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control,
of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is
so granted or paid." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1946). The baffling syntax
of the section has perturbed at least one court. "The punctuation as published is con-
fusing. . . . Commas are not to be suffered to defeat the legislative meaning." Webb-
Crawford do. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1940).
For general discussion of the brokerage clause, consult ZORN & FELDMAN at 204-19;
Austern, Section 2(c), CCH RoBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYmPosIum 37 (1946); Oppen-
heim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 8 GEO.
WASH. L. Rzv. 511 (1940) ; Note, 47 YAIE L.J. 1207 (1938).
188. Southgate Brokerage Co., 39 FTC 166 (1944), enforced, Southgate Brokerage
Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945).
189. 150 F.2d 607, 611.
190. Ibid.
191. See acid criticisms by Adelman: Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws, 61 HARv. L. Rav. 1289, 1335-7 (1948); Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63
HAv. L. Rxv. 27, 54-56 (1949) ; The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory,
63 Q. J. EcoN. 238, 248-50 (1949). See also EDwARDs, MAINTAINING CoALPLriTON 169
(1949) and sources cited in note 187 supra. Only the National Food Brokers' Ass'n
stands opposed to the critical barrage. Its 1950 resolution considers the Robinson-Patman
Act of "great value" and warns that weakening of the Act "would tend to throw the
food industry back to the days of chaotic business conditions." N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1950,
p. 45, col. 1.
192. See note 187 supra.
193. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 634 (1938) ; Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Great A & P
Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940). See
Austern, supra note 187, at 42; Oppenheim, supra note 187, at 145-46. And see state-
ment by Rep. Utterback explaining the brokerage clause: "[W]here sales are made from
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aries to find market outlets. 9 4  But these are not legal services-the buyer
is "doing his own work." . The market effects of the brokerage clause are,
therefore, simple.105 Because a direct buyer is denied functional compen-
sation, an unneeded broker picks up business or a seller pockets the value
of the function. The clause thus grants a legal tollgate to the broker or a
windfall to the seller.190 Ironically, small wholesalers' cooperative buying
agencies are conspicuous victims 97 of strict FTC "brokerage clause" en-
forcement.,'9
buyer to seller [sic], in the nature of the case no brokerage services are rendered by
either, and no payment or allowance on account thereof can be made by either party to
the other." 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936) (emphasis added). Compare note 194 infra.
194. "The broker's task is a genuine marketing function, that of establishing con-
tact between buyers and sellers. In some lines of business, textiles, for instance, the
brokerage function commonly is performed by independent concerns having no regular
or permanent affiliations either with buyers or with sellers. In other fields, notably the
food trades, the broker is essentially a manufacturer's sales representative having close
relationships with a number of manufacturers whom he serves by finding customers. In
these same trades the opposite situation also is to be observed, where the brokerage
function is integrated with the buying side, the broker's job then being that of seeking
prospective sellers. Since the brokerage function per se is that of arranging contacts
between buyers and sellers, there is no essential reason why a broker who is part of a
chain grocery store organization does not perform as typical a brokerage function when
he establishes contacts with canners who have a certain grade of fancy canned corn
available for delivery as some other broker regularly retained by these canners may
perform in seeking out chains." McNair, supra note 6, at 344. See also Zomu & F.LMIAN
at 204-5.
195. The clause, as interpreted, apparently means that (1) an intermediary who acts
for the buyer, or who is controlled by the buyer, cannot be paid by, or receive brokerage
from, the seller even for services rendered to the seller; (2) a seller who ordinarily
utilizes brokers in selling a product may not reflect the non-use of brokers in his price
to particular customers; (3) this restriction applies to sales made to bona fide brokers
who, as part of their operations, buy for their own account. Austern, supra note 187,
at 45.
The universal language of § 2(c) could probably encompass all violations of
§ 2(a). Because of the required "injury" criterion of § 2(a) and that section's permitted
defenses, which do not apply to § 2(c), the distinction may be vital. Yet apparently the
label attached to a particular transaction may invoke the legal consequences of one or the
other section. See id. at 45 n.41.
196. See Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 973 (1949).
197. E.g., Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 634 (1938) ; Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir.
1945).
198. Brokerage clause cases make up more than one-third of all FTC Robinson-
Patman Act proceedings. See Austern, supra note 187, at 38-39, 48-54; statistics cited
in note 72 supra. The Commission apparently has not yet been unsuccessful in a § 2(c)
proceeding.
The all-inclusive statutory language, moreover, has spawned absurdities in private
litigation. See Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950) (steel
delivery contract unenforceable because it stipulated price concession to buyer for
services connected with transaction). But cf. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330
U.S. 473 (1947) (seller's violation of §3 held no defense to his suit for purchase
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Per se violations: The "proportionally equal" clauses.1 99 Elizabeth Arden,
Inc., supplied cosmetics demonstrators to some department store and specialty
shop customers. These services, however, were not granted to other ac-
counts.200  A cease and desist order was affirmed. 20 ' The court emphasized
that the criteria of the price discrimination clause of the Robinson-Patman
did not apply to the "proportionally equal" services clause:202 a showing
of competitive injury was unneeded.
price of goods). And see Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d 674 (5th
Cir. 1942) (supplier's breach of distributor's contract unactionable because volume
rebate formed part of the agreement); Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power
Co., 136 F.Zd 12 (6th Cir. 1943) (seller's bribery of buyer's agent entitles buyer to
treble damages against seller) ; Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93
(S.D. N.Y. 1950) (buyer who pays "under the table" to seller to evade OPA price
regulations has treble damage claim against seller) ; Interborough News Co. v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 10 F.R.D. 330 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (seller who granted rebates to insistent
buyer has treble damage claim against him). Because §2(c) outlaws payment as well
as receipt of "brokerage", all parties in the Allgair and Interborough cases technically
violated the statute. - For that reason, the Court in these companion cases required plain-
tiffs to show "economic coercion" before recovering their money threefold. Payment
to a buyer or his agent for "doing his own .vork," albeit unfaithfully, and payment to
a seller for doing no work link all the above cases to the Robinson-Patman Act's
brokerage clause.
199. §§2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act read: "[I]t shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything
of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person . . . as compensation or
in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in
connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or
commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment
or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers com-
peting in the distribution of such products or commodities." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C. § 13(d) (1946). "[It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor
of one purchaser against another . . . by contracting to furnish or furnishing . . . any
services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale
... upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 49 STAT.
1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1946).
For general discussion, see ZORN & FInMAN at 219-33; Carter, Validity of the
Demonstrator Practice under Section 2(d) and (e), CCH ROBINSON-PATIAN AcT
SYmposium 91 (1946); Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), CCH RoINSON-PAm2IAN AcT
SYmPosiUm 55 (1946); Layton, Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Tcrins, CCH
ROBINSON-PATMAIN AcT SYmPosium 38 (1948); Montague, Proportionally Equal Terms,
CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SymrPosilm 51 (1948). For an excellent early discussion,
see Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 447, 465-72 (1937).
After exploring in detail the verbal inconsistencies of §§ 2(d) and 2(e), one author
concludes that they have no effect in the practical operation of the statute. Dunn,
supra, at 62, 66-68.
200. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 FTC 288, 300-1 (1944).
201. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 FTC 288 (1944), aff'd, Elizabeth Arden, Inc., v.
FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947).
202. 156 F.2d 132, 135.
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The "proportionally equal" clauses of the Robinson-Patman Act are
anomalies.20 3  A seller is prohibited from compensating a customer for
services rendered in connection with the sale, unless such payments are
available to competing customers on "proportionally equal terms." Con-
versely, the seller himself may not furnish buyers with services which are
not accorded to other buyers on "proportionally equal terms. '20 4  Compet-
itive injury is not requisite to illegality.
Blanket illegality ignores the economic functions of suppliers' allowances
and services in promoting sales of branded goods.20 5  Advertising pushes
sales to both distributor's and supplier's advantage. Accordingly, distribu-
tors secure allowances to cover local advertising and display. A supplier,
alternatively, can stimulate sales directly by furnishing sales aids to buyers.
Supplier-paid product demonstrators who operate in buyers' retail outlets
are common in the drug and cosmetics trade.20 6  Chain stores may wield
their bargaining power to secure advertising allowances not available to
independent buyers. But their greater coverage of the buying public stretches
the supplier's advertising dollar.20 7 For similar reasons, department stores
may obtain demonstrator service that other buyers do not get. When a
supplier gains economic benefits from allowances and services, forcing his
sales promotion outlay into more costly channels cannot be justified.
But "bogus" allowances and services from which the supplier gains no
benefit may serve as disguised price concessions to powerful buyers.20 8  In
203. The "proportionally equal" standard is nowhere defined. It in effect establishes
a ratio without a basis of comparison. For that reason, one writer considers the clauses
a "legislative monstrosity." Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patinan Act be Amended?,
CCH ROBINSoN-PATMIAN Acr SYmPOSiUm 141, 146 (1948). See also ZoRa & FELDMAN
at 225-26. Layton, supra note 199, at 45-50 suggests formulas to implement the "baffling
measuring rod."
204. See note 199 supra.
205. "A successful demonstration . . . increases the volume of the manulacturer and
the store and benefits other sellers of the product in the competitive area by creating
a demand that might not otherwise exist." Carter, supra note 199, at 92. And see gen-
erally ZORN & FELDMAN at 219-33; Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied
Economic Theory, 63 Q. J. Eco. 238, 253-54 (1949).
206. ZorN & FELDMAN at 231-32; Carter, supra note 199, at 92; Comment, 46
YALE L.J. 447, 470-72 (1937).
207. McNair, "supra note 6, at 343-44; Note, 58 YAiz L.J. 969, 974 n.33 (1949);
Comment, 46 YALE LJ. 447, 465 (1937).
208. The FTC investigation of chains that preceded Robinson-Patman revealed
widespread use of "bogus allowances" as disguised discriminatory price concessions to
chains. ZoRN & FELDMAN at 222-23. "Section 2(d) is historically designed to stop
pseudo-advertising and sales-promotion allowances by the manufacturer to a larger
dealer in his* product, which make an indirect price concession to him that is injurious to
competing smaller dealers therein." Dunn, supra note 199, at 65. But cf. statement
of Rep. Utterback, in charge of the Patman bill on the floor, explaining §§ 2(d) and (e) :
"The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is, of course, the grant of dis-
criminations under the guise of payments for advertising and promotional services which,
whether or not the services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an advantage to the
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that event, the competitive injury criterion of the price discrimination clause
should govern the "proportionally equal" clauses as well. Special conces-
sions in the form of advertising allowances, demonstrator services, or out-
right price reductions do not call for separate standards of legality.20 9 Even
the broadest Robinson-Patman philosophy must stop short of illegality with-
out injury.2 10
STATUTORY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRICE DIscIMINATION
Price discrimination under the Act may be justified in two ways. Differ-
ential prices that cost savings can account for are permissible. And good faith
meeting of competition by a discriminatory lower price may be a complete
defense.
Cost defense. Price differentials that "make only due allowance for differ-
ences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery" resulting from differing
methods of sale or delivery of goods escape Robinson-Patman illegality.211
customer so favored as compared with others who have to bear the cost of such services
themselves." 80 CONG. Rxc. 9418 (1936) (emphasis added).
209. See proposals by Oppenheim, supra note 203, at 147-48.
210. In practice, the impact of the clauses has struck far afield. The cosmetics industry
has borne the brunt. See Elizabeth Arden, Inc., v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150
F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945) (department store not granted
"proportionally equal" demonstrator services or allowances recovers treble their value
against discriminating manufacturer) ; accord, Sun Cosmetics Shoppe, Inc., v. Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Corn Products Refining Co.
v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 743-45 (1945) (seller's discriminatory advertising expenditures
illegal under § 2(e)); American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d
907 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946) (defendant seller violating market-
ing price agreement by granting "bogus" advertising allowances liable for treble damages
to competing seller). See Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484
(W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd, CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC. 162,895 (8th Cir. 1951)
(runway delivery of cans and runway discount by Indiana manufacturer to adjacent canner
entitles "competing" Arkansas canner not receiving discount to treble damages against
manufacturer). The deceptive simplicity of the Robinson-Patman Act has vitiated appar-
ently valid Sherman Act causes of action. Compare Chicago Seating Co. v. S. Karpen &
Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949) (refusal to sell by manufacturer of uniquely designed
furniture bidding for public contracts, pleaded as discriminatory furnishing of price list
services, held no violation of § 2(e)), with U.S. v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945) (refusal to sell by manufacturer of unique linen rugs bidding for
public contracts held violation of Sherman Act).
211. The relevant portion of section 2(a) reads: "It shall be unlawful . .. to dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers . . . where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition... : Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.. . ." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
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A seller charged with price discrimination can defend his prices with cost
accounting.212 Systematic cost studies that estimate distribution costs to
typical customer classes may be acceptable as a cost justification under the
Act. Thus in the 1inneapolis-Honeywell case, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion permitted a cost study to justify some brackets in the seller's volume
discount schedule.213 Minneapolis-Honeywell's cost defense succeeded because
the Commission found the cost study "made in good faith and in accordance
with sound accounting principles.
''214
But the elements of good faith and sound accounting principles are left
undisclosed. Prior to promulgating the Minneapolis-Honeywell test, the
FTC in the Standard Oil case2 15 had summarily rejected cost studies which
attempted to establish cost differences in serving tank-car and tank-wagon
customers. Despite the standardized nature of gallonage delivery,216 the study
largely failed because conducted in a geographic area other than that in which
the alleged discriminations had occurred.217 The Commission, however, made
no attempt to distinguish Standard in its Minneapolis-Honeywell opinion. It
must be assumed, therefore, that Standard's cost study was made in bad faith
or with unsound accounting principles, or that inconsistent precedents now
rule the FTC's interpretation of the cost defense.
For general analysis of the cost defense, consult Sawyer, Accounting and Statistical
Proof in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 IowA L. REv. 244 (1951) ; Comment, 35 ILL. L.
REv. 60 (1940).
212. The burden of proving cost savings is on the seller charged with price discrimina-
tion. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948). A buyer charged with knowingly
accepting discriminatory prices must prove the seller's cost savings to escape. Automatic
Canteen Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 14,398 (FTC 1950).
Procedures for allocating distribution cost are described in Case Studies in Distribution
Cost Accounting for Manufacturing and Wholesaling, H.R. Doc. No. 287, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941) ; Heckert, Back to Distribution Costs, 79 J. ACCOUNTANCY 456 (1945);
Longman, Distribution Costs, 70 J. AccouNTANcy 232, 431 (1940).
Distribution cost accounting is of recent vintage. Improvement of distribution cost
procedures was expected as a major by-product of the Robinson-Patman Act. In 1937
there was "a great new stirring throughout business concerning methods of checking
distribution costs." George, Business and the Robinson-Patinan Act, 4 LAW & CoNxTrp.
PROB. 329, 401-2 (1937). In 1941, an FTC investigation of distribution cost procedures
revealed "a dearth of good case material." Sawyer, supra note 211, at 256. In 1951, dis-
tribution cost accounting was still in its "pioneering stage." Id. at 259-60. A respondent
attempting to establish a cost defense will thus be forced to operate on the fringes of
accountancy.
213. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 FTC 351, 380-82, 394 (1948), rev'd on
other grounds, CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEc. 62,881 (7th Cir. 1951).
214. 44 FTC 351, 394.
215. Standard Oil Co., 41 FTC 263, 281 (1945). For an analysis of Standard's cost
defense and criticism of its outright rejection, see Adelman, Integration and Antitrust
Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27, 64-66 (1949).
216. Adelman, supra note 215, at 64 nn.102, 103 and text.
217. 41 FTC 263, 278-79.
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But more recent cases hold systematic cost studies of customer classes in-
herently inadequate. A showing of cost savings in separate transactions
with individual customers seems required. In two cases 218 the American Can
Company attempted to justify price discrimination by studies that allocated
sales costs to volume discount brackets. One court found the defense's "ulti-
mate fault" in failure to separate costs for individual competitors; a small
buyer's "identity as an individual, for cost purposes, was completely lost."' 210
The other court equally disapproved studies which disregarded individual
transactions and costs of serving individual customers.220  FTC counsel
quickly adopted this novel doctrine in the Champion case.2 2 1
Under current interpretations a cost defense, as a practical matter, is im-
possible.2 22  Functional and quantity discounts at best are overall long run
218. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd,
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951); Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd, CCH TRADE REo. REP. '48-'51 DEC. 1f 62,895 (8th Cir. 1951).
219. Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484, 496 (W.D. Ark.
1949). The Court also distinguished the Minneapolis-Honeywell case. There respondent's
discount schedule contained many brackets, and an independent accounting firm had made
comprehensive cost studies and revised them several times. But American Can's schedule
provided for only three brackets. Moreover, American set up its prices first, and then
conducted cost studies to justify them. It therefore could not meet the "good faith cost
study" test of Minneapolis-Honeywell. Ibid.
220. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 988-89 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
221. Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint, pp. 38-39, Champion Spark Plug Co.,
FTC Dkt. 3977 (pending). See also Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint, pp.
20-21, Electric Auto-Lite Company, FTC Dkt. 5624 (pending).
222. "Any [individual transaction] basis for testing price discrimination seems fairly
absurd as a working principle." Thorp, Price Discrimination and Cost, 63 J. ACCOUNTANCY
183, 185 (1937).
In adversary proceedings, apparently only two respondents have made out successful
cost defenses. Bird & Son, Inc., 25 FTC 548 (1937) ; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., 44 FTC 351 (1948), rev'd oi; other grounds, CCII TRAE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC.
1162,881 (7th Cir. 1951). Both these cases, however, involved group cost studies which
courts rejected in the American Can Cases. Some of the numerous unsuccessful cost
justification attempts are analyzed by Sawyer, supra note 211, at 250-58; Warmack, Cost
Accounting Problems under -the Robinson-Patinan Act, CCH ROBINSON-PATM1AN ACT
Symposiumt 105 (1947) ; Comment, 35 ILL. L. Rnv. 60 (1940).
FTC Commissioner Mason faces a dilemma. People constantly ask him, "Why, if you
adopt without question your own accountants' figures on cost savings in a Robinson-
Patman Act suit and always reject private industry's figures-why in the name of fair
play don't you give us the privilege of coming to you in the first place so you can fix the
prices we shall charge our customers?" Mason, Progress of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, CCH ANTIRUST LAw SYmposium 50, 54 (1951).
Even the successful cost defense may be a Pyrrhic victory. Under the "proportionally
equal" clauses, pp. 959-61 supra, a seller might violate the Act by not according all
customers the opportunity of taking advantage of sale or delivery methods that result in
cost savings. The FTC seems to have argued for this interpretation in one case. See
Haslett, supra note 65, at 473 n.86. For the ambiguous distinction between price dis-
1951]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
estimates of savings through utilization of particular distribution channels or
sales in economical quantities. 223  Separate transactions may never enter the
calculation. And volume discounts cannot be rationally explained in terms
of cost. A large volume purchase clearly contributes to fuller plant utilization
and spreads overhead. But no one customer can claim sole credit as the
marginal buyer-all buyers have contributed equally.224 Finally, selective price
cuts by definition are not related to any cost standards.
A more fundamental objection is the statute's prescription of cost as a
standard for price. Demand conditions, not costs, determine price in a com-
petitive system.225  Price is what the buyer is willing to pay and what the
seller is willing to accept. The cost concept nullifies the demand side of the price
bargain.226 Moreover, the cost concept is inadequate in practice. When two
or more products are jointly produced or distributed, separate costs of each
are factually indeterminate.227 A large part of distribution cost involves joint
costs that are allocable only on an arbitrary basis.228  In short, cost allocations
crimination justified by cost savings, and illegal service allowances, see American Can Co.
v. Russellville Canning Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC. 162,895 at pp. 64,700-1
(8th Cir. 1951). And see Address by Austin Forkner, FTC Attorney, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 17, 1948, p. 41, col. 3. Mr. Forkner explains the buyer's responsibilities under § 2 (f)
and states that a buyer knowingly receiving discriminatory prices must prove the seller's
cost savings to escape. But even if he establishes a successful cost defense, says Forkner,
he may find himself "caught on another limb of the statute" because the items making up
this cost saving may not have been granted by the seller to other competitors "on a pro-
portionally equal basis."
223. McNair, supra note 6, gt 346-47; Adelman, supra note 215, at 38-39.
224. Id. at 39.
225. See Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 447, 482 (1937), criticizing the Act's apparent accept-
ance of "the mistaken view that under competitive conditions price is or should be 'deter-
mined' by costs, even in the 'short period' and at all stages of a trade cycle." See also,
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING ComxPwTIoN 161-62 (1949); MILLER at 363-64; Edwards,
Types of Differential Pricing, 6 J. MARKETING Supp. 156 (1942) ; Hamilton, Cost as a
Standard for Price, 4 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 321, 331-33 (1937) ; Harbeson, The Cost
Concept and Economic Control, 17 HARv. Bus. REv. 257, 262-64 (1939). But cf. Hawkins,
Marketing and the Theory of Monopolistic Competition,- 4 J. MARKETING 382, 385-87
(1940).
226. Prices fluctuate as a function of demand, within limits set by costs. See, e.g.,
Comments: 46 YALE L.J. 447, 482 n.186 (1937) and sources there cited; 57 YALE L.J.
391, 396-97 (1948).
227. Harbeson, supra note 225, at 265.
228. Distribution cost includes all costs in getting goods from factory door to cus-
tomer. Selling, advertising, warehousing, transportation, and credit costs are part of
distribution cost. Heckert, supra note 212, at 456-57. Accountants recognize that much
of this cost is allocable only according to preconceived plans. Id. at 458-59; Longman,
supra note 212, at 432; Ostlund, The Robinson-Patinan Act and Quantity Discounts, 14
AcCTa. REv. 402, 405 (1939). See also Sawyer, supra note 211, at 249, 255.
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are based on business policy, not fact.229 The cost defense is a slippery standard
for permissible pricing.
30
Good faith meeting of competition. In Standard Oil v. FTC,2' the
Supreme Court construed Robinson-Patman's meeting competition clause
232
as an absolute statutory defense to a price discrimination charge. As inter-
229, EIwARws, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 161 (1949) ("allocation[s] ... by policy
decisions . . . masquerade as mere accounting procedures"); Edwards, Comments and
Discussion, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYmposIum 57, 60 (1947) ("the allocation of
joint cost . . . is a matter of business policy, not a matter of fact.") Hamilton, supra
note 225, at 325 ("the motive of pecuniary gain sets the theme for the accountant's song.")
230. Commentators have violently attacked the Robinson-Patman Act's cost defense
concept. McNair, supra note 6, at 337 ("bad economics and impossible accounting");
McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 415-16 (1937) ("utterly overwhelming and subversive of
legitimate business practice"). See also Edwards, supra note 229, at 60 ("we are in dan-
ger of erecting the FTC into a sort of an orthodox cost accounting faculty") ; Edwards,
The Struggle for the Control of Distribution, 1 J. MA=RKEING 212, 216 (1937) ("The
pursuit of discrimination into the labyrinths of cost accounting will produce a clash of
accounting orthodoxies reminiscent of the theological disputes of the early churchmen.").
Dr. Edwards at present is Director of the Bureau of Industrial Economics of the Federal
Trade Commission.
231. 340 U.S. 231 (1951) ; Note, 36 IowA L. Rsv. 351 (1951). For interpretations of
the decision, see Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, CCH ANTITRuST LAw SYmposium
158, 166-68 (1951); Rose, supra note 8, at 245-51, 257-59; Simon, Price Discrimination
to Meet Competition, [1950] U. oF IuL. L. FoRum 575, 584-92 (1951). And see discussion
of the substantive features of Standard at pp. 942-45 supra.
232. "Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of
rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person
charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the
prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services
or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor." 49
STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946). On August 2, 1951, the Senate passed,
without amendment, S. 719, to establish beyond doubt that under the Robinson-Patman
Act it is a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination for the seller to show that
its price differential has been made in good faith to meet the equally low price of a com-
petitor. 97 Cong. Rec. 9661 (Aug. 2, 1951). The proponents of the bill contend that this
amendment codifies the Standard Oil decision. Also included in the measure is a provision
permitting sellers to absorb freight charges in determining prices when the seller can
thereby meet the lower price of a competitor situated more closely to the customer. For
exposition of conflicting views on S. 719, see SEN. REP. No. 293, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951) and id. Part 2 (minority views). See also, CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-'51 DEC.,
Report Letter No. 221, p. 5 (Aug. 13, 1951) ; note 237 infra.
The meeting competition clause is analyzed by Austern, Required Competitive Injury
and Permitted Meeting of Competition, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYmPosIum 63,
66-84 (1947) ; Berger & Goldstein, Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act,
44 ILL. L. REv. 315 (1949) ; Haslett, supra note 65, at 473-80; McCollester, Section 2 (b),
CCH RoBINsoN-PATMAN AcT SYmposium 23 (1946). See also sources cited in note
231 supra.
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preted by the Federal Trade Commission, a successful meeting competition
defense under section 2(b) merely rebutted a prinuz facie violation under
section 2 (a) 233 and called for proof of actual, not merely potential, competitive
injury.23 4  Because the Commission found that Standard's discriminatory
prices had in fact caused competitive injury, it dismissed Standard's defense
as immaterial and made no findings on meeting competition.235  The FTC's
statutory interpretation was upheld by the Seventh Circuit.236 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed and remanded for further findings on the defense.
2 3 7
The decision settles the substantive effect of the defense but wraps its con-
tents in uncertainty. Clearly, "good faith meeting of a competitor's equally
low price," the statutory defense, now excuses price discrimination regardless
of competitive injury. Not so clear are the defense's legal elements. Standard
discriminated only to retain some customers. For that purpose it matched,
but did not undercut, competitors' price offerings of comparable grade gas-
oline.238 The Supreme Court, in a footnote,, considers these facts sufficient
for a complete defense.239 But the Court goes on to discuss apparently separate
233. For ingredients of the prima facie case, see note 128 supra.
234. FTC Brief, pp. 31-32, 35-37, Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). Under
the original Clayton Act, good faith meeting of competition was a complete defense. See
340 U.S. 231, 239-40, 251.
235. Standard Oil Co., 41 FTC 263, 281-82 (1945); FTC Brief, pp. 23-24, Standard
Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
236. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210, 214-17 (7th Cir. 1949).
237. Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). The Court heard two oral argu-
ments in successive terms before handing down its decision. Id. at 234. See also note
92 supra. Interestingly enough, between the 1949 and 1950 terms Congress passed and
thv President vetoed legislation establishing good faith meeting of competition as an
absolute defense. One commentator on the judicial process speculates that the Court's
delay indicated initial agreement with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation and a desire
to let Congress settle the matter. Rose, supra note 8, at 249-50. For pending legislation,
see note 232 supra.
The decision's rationale automatically makes meeting competition an absolute defense
to charges brought under the "proportionally equal" services clause. See 340 U.S. 231,
241 (1951). This clause is discussed at pp. 959-61 supra.
238. 340 U.S. 231, 238 n.7 (1951).
239. Id. at 243 n.9, which in turn refers to id. at 238 n.7, quoting the FTC trial
examiner's conclusions of fact: "The recognition by [Standard] of Ned's Auto Supply
Company as a jobber or wholesaler . . .was a forced recognition given to retain that
company's business. Ned's Company at the time of recognition, and ever since, has
possessed all qualifications required by [Standard] for recognition as a jobber and the
recognition was given and has ever since been continued in transactions between the
parties, believed by them to be bona fide in all respects. . . ." "The differentials on its
branded gasolines [Standard] granted Ned's Auto Supply Company ...were granted
to meet equally low prices offered by competitors on branded gasolines of comparable
grade and quality." Compare the Court's statement, id. at 236 n.4: "We use the term
'jobber' in this opinion merely as one of convenience and identification, because the result
here is the same whether these . .. dealers are wholesalers or retailers." (emphasis
added). But cf. id. at 247 n.14, apparently requiring a showing of "lawful prices."
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requirements of meeting lawful prices, 240 the seller's good faith,241 and eco-
nomic self-defense. 242  No summation weaves the strands into a clear-cut
pattern of legality. Standing alone, Standard perplexes.
The Court's reliance on the Glucose Cases243 may shed light on what
Standard means. The companion Glucose Cases, decided by the Court in
1945, involved geographic pricing systems.244  In Staley, a seller had adopted
the single basing-point system of his "competitors." Staley, located in Decatur,
Illinois, followed prevailing industry practice and quoted prices f.o.b. Chicago.
As a result, buyers in and around Decatur paid "phantom freight." 245 The
Supreme Court found the systems to result in systematic price discriminations
injuring buyers and held them illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act 2 46
Significantly, subsequent FTC proceedings found an industry-wide price-
fixing conspiracy-uniform pricing formulas to which sellers adhered choked
competition among themselves.
247
Staley, nevertheless, claimed meeting competition to defend its own illegal
system. Adopting its competitors' pricing system, it contended, met compe-
240. Id. at 242, 244, 246, 247 n.14, 250. At 244 n.10, the Court cites a lower court
opinion as "indicating" that the price met must be lawful, but does not indicate approval
of that indication. At 247 n.14, the Court refers to a similar "suggestion" in legislative
history. The most conspicuous reference to "lawful" prices, however, appears in the
heading of section III of the opinion. Id. at 238. But neither litigant tendered an issue
of lawful prices. Cf. oral argument, 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3209-11 (1950).
Mr. Justice Reed: "Do you challenge that the competing offers were legal?"
Mr. Cassedy [FTC Counsel]: "I won't challenge it in my argument. The case is
just as strong one way as the other." Id. at 3211.
241. 340 U.S. 231, 247 n.14.
242. Id. at 242, 249, 250.
243. Corn Products Rig. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746 (1945).
244. For an excellent discussion of the basing-point problem and the significant
issues of the Glcose Cases, consult Comment, Price Systems and Competition, 58 YAIE
L.J. 426 (1949), especially at 446-48. And see generally, MACHLup, THE BASING POINT
SYs= (1949), reviewed by Clark, Machiup on the Basing Point System, 63 Q. J.
EcoN. 315 (1949); Symposium, Delivered Pricing, 15 LAw & CoN n'TE1,. PROD. 123-313
(1950). For a recent example of a court wallowing in the basing-point morass, see
American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. '48-51 DEc.
[62,895 (Sth Cir. 1951).
245. FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 755-56 (1945).
246. Corn Products Rfg. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738-39 (1945); FTC v. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 750-51 (1945).
247. In 1947, an FTC complaint alleged a price-fixing conspiracy among Corn
Products, Staley, and other manufacturers together accounting for 95% of the corn
derivatives industry. Two years later the respondents consented to entry of an order
forbidding price fixing. Findings of fact, consented to but not admitted, stated that the
industry members had concertedly used delivered pricing systems and operated trade
associations for central exchange of information, enabling each seller to match exactly
the others' quoted prices to all customers. Because respondents had waived appeal, the
trial examiner's order automatically became the FTC final order on November 20, 1950.
3 CQH TRADE REG. RaP. Iff 14,204; 14,396; 14,491; 14,531.
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tition. The Supreme Court had no trouble rejecting this defense. Staley's
system artificially raised and did not lower prices.248  And Staley had not
acted in good faith when it chose to adopt another's clearly discriminatory
pricing system.249 In short, when an unlawful system artificially raised prices,
its meeting another's like unlawful system was no excuse.
250
Much of the Standard Oil opinion, therefore, is based on factually incom-
parable precedent.25 1  In the Glucose Cases, the Supreme Court reiterated
countless times that it was dealing with sellers' pricing systems. 252  But
Standard made individual price reductions. Standard lowered prices and
competed; Staley artificially raised prices and, the FTC later found,
colluded.253
Narrowly read, Standard Oil spells out a hollow defense. When factual
contexts of the Standard and Staley cases are glossed over, the Standard
opinion's restrictive phrases seem successive legal requirements of the meeting
competition defense. A discriminating seller initially would have to prove
that he matched, but did not shade, a competitor's price offering of goods of
comparable grade. Next, proof of the seller's good faith and the lawfulness
of the prices met would be required. And finally, a seller could prevail only
if he discriminated in economic self-defense to retain his customers.
But each element, separately considered, is a misleading and inadequate
competitive criterion. Meeting but not undercutting price, without more,
is meaningless. Delivery and credit terms, for example, are essential parts
of the price bargain. 254  And when a competitor offers a product with greater
trade acceptance in no way related to grade or quality, 255 merely matching
his price still loses the sale. Conversely, a seller of consumer-favored goods
nominally meets but in fact beats a lesser-known product's price. Preferred
brands may factually undersell competing products without nominally even
248. FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 756-57 (1945).
249. Id. at 757.
250. Id. at 753-54.
251. Staley also granted discriminatory purchase options to some individual buyers.
The Court briefly disposed of this subsidiary issue. Apparently because Staley had
made these concessions without diligence to find out whether it was in fact meeting
actual lower prices of competitors, its meeting competition defense was not sustained.
Id. at 758-60.
252. One page of the Staley opinion alone mentions "systems" nine times. Id. at 753.
253. See note 247 sapra.
254. "To look at price alone is to oversimplify the problem .... Price is merely a
focus for all the complex questions involved in industrial management and industrial
markets." NEisoN & KsIm at 5. See also, Till, The Fiction of the Quoted Price, 4 LAw
& CONTMP. PROB. 363, 368-70 (1937); Learned & Isaacs, supra note 10, at 143-44;
Alderson & Cox, Towards a Theory of Marketing, 13 J. MAREING 137, 139-40 (1948).
255. The FTC has recognized that trade preferences distort the significance of quoted
prices. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Brands, 189 F.2d 510, 513 n.7 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Minne-
apolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 FTC 351, 396-97 (1948), rev'd, CCH TPAnE REG. R'.
'48-'51 DEC. 62,881 (7th Cir. 1951). And see NmsoN & KEIm at 6-7, 67-68 for the
importance of non-price intangible factors in competition.
[Vol. 60: 929
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
approaching their prices. The "naked" price is a deceptive standard of
legality.
No decision to date reveals how a seller must go about proving his good
faith. Sellers attempt to gain sales and earn profits. That is the good faith
of a competitive system. But the intricate Staley opinion tests "good faith"
in several disconnected contexts. Discriminatory prices were not quoted to
meet a lower price, and consequently were not in good faith.25 16  Elsewhere in
the opinion, good faith appears lacking when unlawful prices are met.257 And
finally, good faith seems tied to legally required seller's knowledge of the
prices he meets, or his diligence to find them out.2 5 In the Moss case, the
Second Circuit initially reserved decision on whether good faith meant
more than "actual intent to sell at the price named."2 59  After the Staley
decision, that court clarified its earlier opinion. A discriminating seller could
not "escape" unless he proved his price offers to be in fact no lower than his
competitors' prices, or "that [he] did not mean them to be."'2 0 A competitor
looking to the case law for guidance must surely come away perturbed.
26 1
Meeting lawful prices, moreover, presupposes prophets, not competitors.
Active competitors' books and price records are not open to each others'
inspection. And sellers pricing in the haste and pressure of the market do
not request affidavits from their customers to prove that competitors' price
offers were within the law. 262  When only lawful prices can be met, a seller
must compete at his peril. If he correctly guesses that his competitors'
prices are illegal, he may stand aside, lose his sales, and gain a treble-damage
lawsuit. But the competitor, though at first blush quoting illegal discrimina-
tory prices, at the trial might turn up with a successful cost defense. Or he
could vindicate himself by in turn proving his good faith meeting of a third
seller's lawful price. In that event, the cautious seller loses both his sales
and his lawsuit. And if the seller meets competitors' prices that he mis-
takenly guessed to be legal, he loses his defense to a Robinson-Patman Act
256. 324 U. S. 746, 758 (1945).
257. Id. at 757.
258. Id. at 759. At another point, "good faith" dangles in limbo. Id. at 755.
259. 148 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 734 (1945).
260. 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946).
261. In the Standard case, the FTC at one point argued before the Supreme Court that
good faith was surplus verbiage in the statute. FTC Brief, pp. 41-42. But to secure a
remand for further findings were the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of it not upheld, the FTC
later reversed its field. It contended that it had not yet considered Standard's good faith
as a factual issue. In ruling on good faith, the Commission might well adopt a "vigorous
interpretation." This would take into account that Standard met some price offerings of
competitors against whom Robinson-Patman Act charges were pending, and that offerings
were made by non-majors selling unbranded gasoline. Again, the Commission might con-
sider the "objective test" of injury to competition as the only practicable way of determining
good faith. Id. at 44-45.
The "objective test," of course, would nullify the substantive defense by reducing it to
the procedural interpretation that the Supreme Court reversed.
262. See, e.g., Simon, .supra note 231, at 587; Austern, sutpra note 232, at 83.
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charge. If sellers must hurdle legal barriers of meeting only lawful prices
in a state of metaphysical good faith, competition will not be very lively.
A restrictive interpretation of Standard not only creates procedural handi-
caps, but is economically unsound. If sellers may only lower prices to retain
customers in economic self-defense, rivals are granted vested rights in trade.
Competing sellers do not allocate customers, but strive by lower prices to
expand their sales. In active competition, high-price sellers must lose out.
263
Little incentive to competitive efficiency remains when competitors are shielded
from their rivals' price attacks. Moreover, a new concept of "retainable"
customers leads into statutory bogs. 264 A customer may be one who negotiates
with a view to buying, one who has bought at some time in the past, or one
who currently buys. Robinson-Patman's "retainable" customer entitled to
sellers' special price treatment would require further judicial definition.
Present statutory ambiguity does not commend new interpretive quirks.
Standard's competitive undercurrent calls for a broader reading of the
opinion. The basic conflict between Robinson-Patman and antitrust policy
was apparent to the Court.26 5  It did not "reconcile, in its entirety, the
economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with that of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. ' 2 66 ]But the Court must have meant at least to
mitigate that conflict. In assuming that Congress did not intend the
Robinson-Patman Act to "abolish competition," 26 7 the majority sidestepped
much legislative history, admittedly confused, largely pointing the other
way.26 3 A strong three-judge dissent heavily bolstered by Congressional
263. "In an economy based upon private enterprise, the threat of business loss and of
possible bankruptcy is a necessary supplement to the incentive of possible profits. The
desire to avoid losses is a part of the driving force behind business. Without it, there
would be a premium upon the launching of improvident and ill-conceived enterprises."
EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 13 (1949).
264. See Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 158,
166-67 (1951).
265. In the course of oral argument, for example, Justice Jackson inquired what the
competition was that the Robinson-Patman Act protected. When FTC counsel replied
that it was the competition of the retailers who lost business, the Justice protested that
it was the essence of competition in a capitalist system that the low-price seller gets the
customer. 18 U.S.L. WEEK 3210 (1950).
The conflict between the FTC order in the Standard case and antitrust policy is dis-
cussed at pp. 943-45 suepra. See also note 92 supra.
266. 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951).
267. Ibid.
268. Rep. Utterback, member of the Conference Committee, made the statement most
directly opposed to the majority's reading of the statute. He explained to the House that
meeting competition is "not... an absolute bar to a charge of [price] discrimination....
[The] provision is entirely procedural. It does not determine substantive rights, liabilities,
and duties." 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936). And Rep. Patman, co-sponsor of the Act, was
equally blunt. "[T]he provision permits the accused to throw himself on the mercy of
the court. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 40 (1938).
Commentators who delved into legislative history reached opposite conclusions. Berger
& Goldstein, supra note 232, at 322-25, and Haslett, supra note 65, at 477, read Con-
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reports and debates makes clear that the majority sought to accomplish fun-
damental change.2 69  Pocking the substantive meeting competition defense
with pitfalls for the seller would clearly rob the decision of significance.
Standard should make meeting competition a flexible defense adapted to
particular facts. To retain its customers, Standard matched but did not
undercut competitors' prices. Illegalizing this, the Court must have thought,
clashed with Sherman Act objectives. 270  Its discussion of meeting but not
beating prices in economic self-defense may simply mirror Standard's facts
coupled with a warning to powerful sellers that predatory price cutting will
not be tolerated. And the Glucose Cases' significance could not have escaped
the Court. A price-fixing conspiracy was the crux of an uncontested industry-
wide offense.271 When one seller attempted to justify his unlawful pricing sys-
tem by meeting the "competition" of others' unlawful systems, absence of good
faith and lawful prices handily disposed of a perverse defense. Standard's
good faith and lawful price discussion may reaffirm the Staley holding to
emphasize that collusive price matching is no excuse. In short, Standard
should mean that competitive pricing is defensible, predatory or collusive
pricing is not.
Though Robinson-Patman's restrictive web will still entangle active com-
petitors, a broad interpretation of Standard gives them a chance to escape.
The Supreme Court did not remand for separate findings on separate issues
of good faith, lawful prices, and economic self-defense. Rather, the heading
of section III of the opinion reads "There should be a finding as to whether
petitioner's price reduction was made in good faith to meet a lawful equally
low price of a competitor. ' 272  Other interpretations are equally plausible.2 73
gressional intent as establishing a substantive defense. Rose, supra note 8, at 246-47 reads
legislative history to find meeting competition a mere procedural rebuttal.
269. Justice Reed wrote a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice
Black joined. Justice Minton, author of the Seventh Circuit opinion, did not participate.
The dissent interpreted the majority opinion as leaving "what the seller can do almost as
wide open as before" the Robinson-Patman Act. 340 U.S. 231, 253 (1951).
270. See note 265 supra. Even the dissenters concluded that the FTC's order might
have to be amended, though they would affirm the Seventh Circuit "in principle." 340 U.S.
231, 267 (1951). They agreed that nondiscriminatory pricing tended to weaken competi-
tion, id. at 253-54, specifically disaffirmed ipproval of the Act's wisdom, id. at 267 n.17,
and cited Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HAiv. L. REv. 1289
(1948), for discussion of its merits. Id. at 254 n.5. The Adelman article, at 1334-7,
scourges the Robinson-Patman Act as essentially anti-competitive.
271. See note 247 supra.
272. 340 U.S. 231, 238 (1951) (emphasis added). Standard's General Counsel read
the opinion as containing no "joker," but as merely reaffirming the Staley case. Austern,
supra note 231, at 168 n.38.
273. One commentator concludes that the Court remanded for a finding of lawful
prices, and that the decision added this new requirement as a constituent element of
good faith. He argues, however, that it should be the FTC's burden to prove that the
prices met were not lawful. Note, 36 IowA L. REv. 351, 367 (1951). Other writers
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Only future adjudication can tell whether Standard's ambiguities freed
competition.27 4
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
Fifteen years of enforcement have failed to stake out boundaries for the
Robinson-Patman Acts' vague universals. Cut loose from original legislative
objectives, recent proceedings reach out into all sectors of the economy to
strike down business practices previously thought competitive. Decisions
superimpose ambiguities on uncertain statutory language. And private litiga-
tion, since the statute's text does not restrain forays into absurdity,
275 still
further expands the reach of the Act.
Only a uniform price policy is fully secure from Robinson-Patman proceed-
ings and treble-damage claims. 276 In imperfect markets, however, uniform
prices make for more perfect monopoly. 77 Prices smashed into uniformity
by competitive hammering are the hallmark of perfect competition. But
economics do not work in reverse-uniform prices do not create competition.
Colluding sellers end competition by matching uniform prices so that any
seller's deviation can be quickly spotted. 78 Simple price structures lessen
interpret the decision as calling for a finding of good faith. Rose, supra note 8, at 258;
Simon, supra note 231, at 585.
But since the FTC made no findings of any kind in connection with meeting competi-
tion, the Court in all probability would not remand for partial findings on segments
of the defense.
274. Two subsequent cases have dealt with meeting competition. In a treble-damage
action, one seller claimed injury by a competitor's discriminatory prices. When defendant
ingeniously contended that plaintiff should have met these prices, plaintiff argued that
Standard Oil permitted only lawful prices to be met. The Court avoided a ruling on
Standard and held that meeting prices, in any event, was not obligatory on a competing
seller. Dean Milk Co. v. American Processing & Sales Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP.
'48-'51 DEC. 62,777 (N.D. Ill. 1951). And the Second Circuit held that a seller who
"met" competitors' prices for smaller quantities with similar prices for larger quantities
had no valid defense. The Court interpreted an "equally low price of a competitor" to
mean an equally low price for a given quantity, and said nothing about the seller's good
faith. FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
275. See especially private litigation under the brokerage clause, note 198 supra.
See also notes 73 and 210 supra. For litigation bordering the grotesque, see the Russell-
yille case, 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), re7vd, CCH TADE REG. REP. '48-'51
DEC. ff62,895 (8th Cir. 1951).
276. "Not until there is a discrimination in price . . . does § 2(a) of the Act have
any application." Bird & Son, Inc., 25 FTC 548, 558 (1937). See also, Austern, Incon-
sistencies in the Law, CCH ANmTsRT LAw Syirmposlum 158, 163-64 (1951); EDWAs,
MAINTAINING COMPETITION 164 n.9 (1949). And see note 11 supra.
277. See, e.g., NELsON & KEim at 8-9; Fly, supra note 46, at 1347.
278. The Sugar Institute case, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), revealed one of the most
perfect restraints of trade in antitrust history. The Institute enforced among refiner
members not only open sales prices and standardized terms of sale, but also a uniform
unit price regardless of quantities sold. But "[tihe fact of the matter is that the
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mutual uncertainty. Recent cases, moreover, consider industry-wide price
uniformity strong evidence of price-fixing conspiracy.2 79 But pricing that
would dispel such suspicions probably violates the Robinson-Patman Act.
280
Compulsory one-price policies, furthermore, create rigid market struc-
tures not subject to competitive pressures. Powerful buyers prevented
from forcing discriminatory concessions may drift to smaller sellers and
output contracts. 281 Small sellers, consequently, may first be estranged
from alternative market outlets and then exploited. 282 Weaker buyers,
however, cannot as readily shift their sources of supply. Compelled to deal
with powerful suppliers, they cannot challenge sellers' dominance over
price. The sellers' and buyers' pairing off,28 3 therefore, removes competi-
tive offsets to economic power and increases the exploitative potential of size.
Robinson-Patman bill practically enacted the Sugar Institute code." Adelman, Effective
Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 I-A~v. L. REv. 1289, 1334 (1948). "[N]ow the
Federal Trade Commission can enforce the very thing the Sugar Institute was con-
denmed for doing. It's about time we had a suit to quiet title between the position of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission." Lowell B. Mason, Acting
Chairman, FTC, Federal Trade Conmnission--With a New Look 5 (address on January
25, 1950, mimeographed copy in Yale Law Library). For comprehensive analysis of
the Sugar Institute's activities and litigation, consult Fly, Observations on the Antitrust
Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions, 45 YALnE L.J. 1339, 46
YALE L.J. 228 (1936).
279. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). "Thousands of secret
sealed bids have been received by public agencies which corresponded in prices of cement
down to a fractional part of a penny." Id. at 713. See Comment, Price Systems and
Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 426, 448-50 (1949). And cf. Allied Paper Mills v. FTC,
168 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948); Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 974 (4th
Cir. 1949).
280. Cf. Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949) (price-
fixing allegations disproved by evidence of widespread deviations from listed prices);
Simon, Legal Price Fixing, CCH ANrITsS LAw SYan'osIum 83, 86-87 (1951).
Benjamin Fairless, president of US Steel, fears that confused antitrust laws confront
business leaders with the alternative of going broke or running their businesses from
jail. He argues that if businessmen quote identical prices they may violate the Sherman
Act; if one of them cuts prices to beat competitors he transgresses the Robinson-Patman
Act; if he raises his prices and the others refuse to follow he goes out of business; if
others do follow he stays in business but again may tangle with the Sherman Act.
Quoted by Rose, supra note 8, at 222.
281. Cf. Learned & Isaacs, supra note 10, at 151-52; Burns, supra note 10, at 318.
282. For discussion of output contracts, consult Havighurst & Berman, Requirement
and Output Contracts, 27 I.L.. L. REv. 1 (1932). Their use as tools of exploitation is
discussed in Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1161, 1165 (1949). "[A] manufacturer may accept a low
price because he has become dependent upon the large buyer; he may have allowed his
selling organization to shrink and have relied upon continued orders from the large firm.
Turning to small orders means incurring the initial costs of entering an alternative
market." Burns, supra note 10, at 318. And cf. Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
283. Cf. MIuzax at 170-71.
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The Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts should prevent price
discrimination dearly harmful to competitive public policy.284 Power to
segregate and exploit markets can only be eliminated by antitrust surgery
after market analysis. A price discrimination statute deals with symptoms
and cannot cure causes.285 When a monopolist discriminates between non-
competing buyers, and competing sellers cannot be injured when there are
none, Robinson-Patman by its terms is inapplicable.28 6  Predatory price
cutting to eliminate competitors violates the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The Muller case 28 7 was brought under both statutes. For the reviewing
court section 5 of the FTC Act fully covered the offense; Robinson-Patman
need not have existed. Predatory price cutting, moreover, need not even be
discriminatory. A sufficiently strong seller can cut all his prices to stifle
weaker rivals.288  Robinson-Patman could not interfere.
28 9
The Robinson-Patman Act, therefore, is both antithetical to antitrust
policy29° and unnecessary for antitrust enforcement. To cope with price dis-
284. Sherman Act cases solely dealing with predatory price cutting are rare. Such
price discrimination generally appears as part of a broader monopolistic program. See,
e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911). EDWARDS, MAINTAINING
COMPETITION 166 (1949). But predatory price cutting violates §5 of the FTC Act.
E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
Private litigants are specifically authorized by statute to enforce the Sherman Act
through injunctions and treble damage suits against violators. E.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888
(S.D. N.Y. 1948). But because the FTC Act does not specifically authorize private suits,
courts have dismissed private claimants under § 5 of the Act for want of jurisdiction.
Samson Crane Co. v. Union National Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd
mere., 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). A broad interpretation of §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act which specifically authorize private redress for violations of the "antitrust laws"
could include private suits under FTC § 5 as an antitrust law. Moreover, other statutes
that do not specifically authorize private relief have been judicially interpreted as granting
private causes of action. E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946) (leading case upholding private cause of action for violation of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act), discussed in Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1133-5 (1950). And
see generally, Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HAgv. L. REv. 987
(1949); Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes Not Affording
Such Remedy, 48 COL. L. Rv. 1090 (1948).
285. "Within the broad policy of the antitrust laws, the function of the law against
price discrimination is essentially palliative. It cannot remove the difficulties that have
been created by fewness and large size. That is a task requiring other instruments."
EDwARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 169 (1949). See also MILLa at 407-9.
286. EnvARos, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 164 n.9 (1949); MILLER at 144-45.
287. E. B. Muller v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
288. Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 806-7 (1946); EDWARDS,
MAINTAINING CO ETl,'ITION 170 (1949).
289. The Department of Justice and private litigants, however, can bring suit under
§ 3 of the Act. See note 65 supra.
290. Economists' recent writings consistently emphasize the anti-competitive keynote
of Robinson-Patman. See EDWARDs, MAINTAINING CoMPEn oN 166-69 (1949); Adel-
man: Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HIARv. L. REv. 1289, 1334
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crimination as part of a coherent antitrust program, law and economics must
jibe. Robinson-Patman's demonstrated blindness to economic consequences
blocks the market analysis essential to this result. Past performance argues
strongly for its demise.
(1948) ; Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Rrv. 27, 60 (1949) ; Integration
and the Outlook for the Future, CCH ANrIRusTr LAW SYmposium 135, 138 (1951);
Burns, in The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust Laws: A Synposi u , 39 Am. EcoN.
REV. 689, 695 (1949) ; Mason, The Clirrent Status of the Monopoly Problem in the U.S.,
62 H v. L. REv. 1265 (1949) ; Rostow, Monopoly linder the Sherman Act: Power or
Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REV. 745, 749 (1949).
See also CouNcn oF EcoNomic ADvisEas, THInD ANNuAL REPORT TO THE PREsIDENT
15 (1948) : "The tendency toward soft competition has ... been exhibited in the Robinson-
Patman Act, which prohibits price-making policies previously accepted as legitimate
features of hard rivalries for business.... The philosophy of the Sherman Act appears to
be yielding to a policy of 'ethical competition', which does not differentiate between the
stability of the individual firm and the stability of the total economy." And see Statement of
John D. Clark, Member, Council of Economic Advisers: "We have also been sympathetic
with the plea of businessmen that if penalties are imposed for the violation of a law
prohibiting business policies which have for years been accepted as fair, vigorous com-
petition, the liability should be clearly expressed in the statute and should not be a trap
buried under general language so ambiguous that the Supreme Court itself cannot decide
what it means.... [T]here is a heavy burden of proof upon him who would temper the
storms of competition for the lamb .... He must make an exceedingly strong case that
his proposal will not, by depriving competition of its vigor, deny the people those benefits
of larger production, lower costs and prices, and improved standard of living which the
Sherman Act was designed to promote." Hearings before the Subcommittee on a Study
of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 14, Part I, 114 (1949).
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